Book V

The design which we proposed to ourselves is now

nearly completed. Next in order follow the causes of

serve and revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they

are ; what elements work ruin in particular states, and

out of what, and into what they mostly change ; also

what are the elements of preservation in states generally,

or in a particular state, and by what means each state

may be best preserved: these questions remain to be

Govern- In the first place we must assume as our starting-point

always that in the many forms of government which have sprung

some kind up there has always been an acknowledgment of justice

of justice, and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in

attaining them, as indeed I have already explained

Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that

those who are equal in any respect are equal in all

respects; because men are equally free, they claim to

be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion

that those who are unequal in one respect are in all

respects unequal ; being unequal, that is, in property,

they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The 4

democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be

equal in all things ; while the oligarchs, under the idea

that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form

of inequality. All these forms of government have a 5

kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they

Those who are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their

have not share in the government does not accord with their pre-

Reading ma with the MSS and Bekker's first edition.

REVOLUTIONS : THEIR CAUSES. 145

6 conceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in V. i. 1301 b. virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone got their

can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then make

7 they are of all men the least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank;

for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors. Here then, so to speak,

8 are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution;

and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the Revolution one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change kinds: from an existing form into some other, for example, from

democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into demo- tution is cracy, or from either of them into constitutional govern- ment or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not (a) when affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the only are form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their

9 own hands. Further, there is a question of degree; an The change oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligar- of degree. chical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and

in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained.

10 Or, the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, e.g. the establishment or overthrow

of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias, the ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes,

11 a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Heliaea when an election takes place, and the office of the single archon [survives, which] is another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion, for instance, a perpetual monarchy among

ᵃ Cp. iii. 13. § 25. ᵇ Cp. c. 4. § 13. Cp. iv. 8. § 9. Cp. iv. 8. § 3.

Cp. vii. 14. § 2. Cp. iii. 16. § 1.

V. 1. equals ; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion. Equality of Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and propor- two kinds, numerical and tional ; by the first I mean sameness or equality in proportional. number or size ; by the second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is equal to the excess of two over one ; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was 13 saying before, men agree about justice in the abstract, but they differ about proportion ; some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they are unequal in all. Hence there are two principal forms of govern- 14 ment, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more com- 1302 a. mon. In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue ? whereas the poor everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing ; the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, 15 as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed ; numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others. Democracy Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to safer than revolution than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is 16 the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the

Or, placing a comma (as Bekker has done in his second edition) after ὁμολογοῦσι, 'while men agree that justice is proportion, they differ in thinking — some that,' etc.

Cp. iv. 11. § 14. Cp. c. 6. Cp. c. 5.

THE GREAT SOURCE OF REVOLUTION. 147

middle class more nearly approximates to democracy V. i. than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and The causes causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number ; and we have now to give an outline of each. We want to know (1) what is the feeling? and (2) what are the motives of those who

2 quarrels ? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz. the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves ; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not

3 more but the same or less than their inferiors ; pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss ; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonour

4 from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons of these motives and dispositions which are excited in men, about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way, may be regarded as seven, and in another as more ***

5 than seven. Two of them have been already noticed ; but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honour — not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to

1302 b. obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly

6 or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state ; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.

* Omitting ἤ before τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. * Supra §§ 2, 3.

V. 3. What share insolence and avarice have in creating (1, 2) inso- revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. When avarice the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. It is (3) unequal evident, again, what an influence honour exerts and of honours; how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are themselves dishonoured and who see others obtaining honours rise in rebellion ; the honour or dishonour when undeserved is unjust ; and just when awarded according to (4) pre- merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when 5 of indivi- one or more persons have a power which is too much for duals; the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And, therefore, in some places, as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. But how much better to provide from the first that there should be no such preeminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding a remedy.

(5) fear; Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have 4

committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment; or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits

that were brought against them. Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution; for example, in

oligarchies — when those who have no share in the state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy was overthrown before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes before the insurrection.

Cp. iii. 13. § 15. Cp. c. 5. § 2.

increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made

up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved ; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the 1303a. rest of the body two spans ; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal : even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly ; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in

7 constitutional states. And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy; or, as was the case at Argos, where, after the battle

at Hebdome, the Argives, having been cut to pieces by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, were compelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioeci ; and at Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry in the times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the roll of

8 citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause in democracies as well as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into

9 an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government also change— sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their

own partisans) ; or owing to carelessness when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices, as at Oreus, where, upon the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government.

Cp. iii. c. 13. § 21. Reading ἐπί.

V. 3. Again, the revolution may be accomplished by small degrees; 10 I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. For the Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all. Another cause of revolution is difference of races 11 which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, neither is it a multitude

brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, being the more numerous, afterwards expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their 12 fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, 13 after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries 1303b. to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows; the people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.

Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under 14 the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share. Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution 15 when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve

OCCASIONS OF REVOLUTIONS. 151

the unity of the state. For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenae did not agree with the people of the island ; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians ; at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in war, the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice ; next

comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other

antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this.

In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at stake. Trifles are most important when they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse ; for the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a love-quarrel of two young men, who were in the government. The story is that while one of them was away from home his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he to revenge himself seduced the other's wife. They then drew all the members of the ruling

class into their quarrel and made a revolution. We learn from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The mistake

lies in the beginning — as the proverb says — 'Well begun is half done;' so an error at the beginning, though quite

4 small, has the proportion of a half to the whole matter. In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city

is involved, as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian Hestiaea. War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance; one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father's property and the treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes.

5 At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the Delphi. 1301a. beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this

V. 4. case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen came to the bride and went away without taking her. Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure [among his offerings] while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the

Mitylene. temple. At Mitylene, too, a dispute about heiresses 6 was the beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took their city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two daughters; Doxander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his sons; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of

Phocis. whom he was proxenus) to interfere. A similar quarrel 7 about an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the father of Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus; this was the beginning of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of Epidamnus. A certain man betrothed his daughter secretly to a person whose father, having been made a magistrate, fined the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state.

Governments also change into oligarchy or into 8 democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase unduly in power or renown. Thus at Athens the reputation

Illustra- gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian

tions from War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire of the sea, strengthened

Argos, the democracy. At Argos, the notables, having 9 distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the demo-

Syracuse, cracy. At Syracuse, the people having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians,

* Cp. ii. 12. § ; viii. 6. 11.

Revolutions occur when some section of the state

AND THE MANNER OF EFFECTING THEM. 153

changed the constitutional government into democracy. V. 4. At Chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables, killed Chalcis. Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined Ambracia, with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander,

10 transferred the government to themselves. And generally, it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.

11 Revolutions break out when opposite parties, e.g. the Unstable the rich and the poor, are equally balanced, and there is little

or nothing between them ; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon

12 them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue do not stir up insurrections, being always a minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of

13 making the revolution or afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds ; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived

into a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and when the deception was over, still endeavoured to retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which affect constitutions generally spring from the above-mentioned causes

Cp. supra c. 3. § 10 and infra c. 12 § 16. Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

Revolutions in democracies are caused by demagogues, as

And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public they stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of Cyme which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine; — either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth confiscated.

* Cp. supra c. 3. § 4. Cp. c. 3. § 8 and iv. 15. § 15.

THE DEMAGOGUE AND THE TYRANT. 155

6 Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then V. 5. democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient Dema-

7 tyrants were originally demagogues. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they

were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power ; at any rate instances to the

8 contrary are few and slight. Formerly tyrannies were Of old. more common than they now are, because great power was often placed in the hands of individuals ; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work ; and their

9 chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they

10 had put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought Dionysius. worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus

and the rich ; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy ; for where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above

11 the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.

These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.

* Cp. c. 12 § 4; Plato Rep. viii. 565 D. Cp. Infra c. 12 § 5.

V, 6. There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies [one coming from without, the other from within the government]: (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as was Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But revolutions which commence outside the governing

class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change. For the notables fell out among themselves, because only a few shared in the government; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son could not hold office together, and, if there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the government. (2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts : either (i) he practises upon the oligarchs themselves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at

THEIR CAUSES EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 157

Athens the party of Charicles predominated among the Thirty, that of Phrynichus in the Four Hundred); or (2) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens endeavoured to gain over the people because they were elected by them ; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be mem-

are independent of the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favour, and so they change the constitution ; this happened

at Heraclea in Pontus. Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them ; for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the

people. Changes in the oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant living ; for then they want to innovate, and either try to

1306 a. make themselves tyrants, or install some one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and as at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them

up against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person who carried on the negotiation with Chares endeavoured to revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party, sometimes they rob the treasury, and then, either the

other oligarchs quarrel with the thieves, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, or they with the other oligarchs. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within; of this we may see an example at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves. Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oli-

158 OLIGARCHY DANGERS IN PEACE AND WAR.

garchy is created within the original one, that is to say, when the whole governing body is small and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because, although in number ninety, the senators were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants. Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defence of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa when Simos and the Aleuadae had the government, and at Abydos in the

quarrels also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned some instances; another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage. A revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class taking offence at their excessive despotism; for example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and at Chios.

δικαστήρια. Cp. c. 4. §§ 5-7.

REVOLUTIONS IN OLIGARCHIES. 159

Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or

other magistrate to persons having a certain money quali-

fication, often occur by accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as large, and then everybody participates in every office; this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly.

18 These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.

We must remark generally, both of democracies and oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another Changes in variety of the same class; I mean to say, from those be " forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated ?asS by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely. *""**•

In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few 7* only share in tlie honours of the state ; a cause which Causes of has been already shown to affect oligarchies ; for an in anstoaristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, ' • is the government of a few, although the few are the (i)jeaiousy, virtuous and not the wealthy; hence the two are often

2 confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to (•)f)ride of happen, and must happen, when the majority of the people arc high-spirited, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers. Thus at Laccdaemon the socalled Parthcniae, who were the [illegitimate] sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize Tarcntum. Again, (3) disrevolutions occur when great men who arc at least ofhivh!" equal merit are dishonoured by those higher in office, |||P| *

3 as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta: or, when a brave man is excluded from the honours of the state, like Cinadon, who conspired against the Spartans under

i6o REVOLUTIONS IN ARISTOCRACIES, ETC.

V. 7. Agesilaus ; or, again, when some are very poor and (4) «- others very rich, a state of society which is most often the

wealth and result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the da)rs of the Messepoverty. . . . proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, en-

titled 'Good Order;' for he speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and wanted to have a

redistribution of the land. Again, revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and might be greater,

wants to rule alone, as at Lacedaemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like Hanno at Carthage.

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements, democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is the endeavour of constitutional governments; and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim but differ from polities by the addition of virtue; hence some of them are more and some less permanent. Those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional go-

vernments. And therefore the latter are the safer of

the two; for the greater the number, the greater the

SSto? strength, and when men are equal they are contented.

cracies. be- But the rich, if the government gives them power, are 7

rest on a apt to be insolent and avaricious ; and, in general, which-

b s. ever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it

changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional

government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, an

The change oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aris-8

SSer tocracy may change into democracy. This happens

direction, BOOK. Under the idea that they are being

wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form.

REVOLUTIONS IN MIXED GOVERNMENTS. 161

In like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own. 9 What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii, where the qualification for office, though at first high, was reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land.

10 Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where property has passed into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage connexion with Dionysius,

but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy.

11 I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned by trifles. In aristocracies, above all, they

are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so imperceptibly. with greater ease the government change something else which is a little more important, until they have under-

12 mined the whole fabric of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after Illustration. Thurii. an interval of five years, and some high-spirited young

men who were popular with the soldiers of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to

13 elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge

Cp. c. 3. § 12. Cp. ii. 9. § 14. c. 4. § I.

162 THE PRESERVATION OF STATES.

V. 7. of these matters, and who are called councillors, at first determined to resist, but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the constitution. But other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose; and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists who established a dynastic oligarchy. Revolutions All Constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without; the latter, when there is some government at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the democracies.

I have now explained what are the chief causes of

revolutions and dissensions in states.

8. We have next to consider what means there are of

Revolutions preserving states in general, and also in particular cases.

avoided. In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes

The knowledge which destroy states, we shall also know the causes which

posites is preserve them; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation.

In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more especially in small

matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at

last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. The change does not take place all at once, and therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that 'if each part is little, then the whole is little.' And this is true in one way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles. In the first place, then, men should guard against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should

Cp. iv. c. 11. § 18. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. i. § 4.

. already spoken invented only to deceive the people,

5 for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further and not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes,

not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honour, or the common people in a matter of money; and they should treat one another and their

6 fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues

are very likely to arise among them, as I have already

7 remarked. The short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them.

8 States are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the state. Wherefore the ruler who has a care of the state should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order

Cp. iv. 13. § 1. vi. 7. § 4.

Supra c. 6. § 6. Cp. c. 8. § 6.

V. 8. that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax their attention. He should endeavour too by help of the laws to control the

of the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from being drawn in. No ordinary man can discern the begin-

ning of evil but only the true statesman. The census to be periodically revised. As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth year. 1308b. If the whole is many times greater or many times less than when the rates were fixed at the previous census, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where in the absence of any such provision the standard is raised, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; where the standard is lowered, constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy. No individual should be too powerful. It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for a long time rather than great honour for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honours which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he and his followers should be sent out of the

Cp. c. 4. §§ 1-3. Cp. c. 3. § 8; c. 6. §§ 16-18.

* Or, adding καὶ μοναρχία 'monarchy,' with many MSS. and Bekker's first edition.

13 country. And since innovations creep in through the V. 8. private life of individuals, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason an increase of prosperity in any part of the state should be

14 carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is Opposite always to give the management of affairs and offices should be of state to opposite elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or

to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality.

15 But above all every state should be so administered Office and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot pos- be lucrative. sibly make money. In oligarchies special precautions

16 should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offence at being kept out of the government — indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private business — but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they

17 lose both honour and profit. If office brought no profit, An unpaid then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be

lasoon. combined; for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, way of combining

which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would tocracy and

18 be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices; for the poor

will not want to have them when there is nothing to be gained from them — they would rather be attending to their own concerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower

19 class. In order to avoid peculation of the public money,

Cp. c. 3. § 3; iii. 13. § 15. Cp. c. 12. 14

Neither oligarchy nor democracy should be pushed to

The oligarchical oath should be reversed.

The young should be trained in 'the spirit of the constitution.'

on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other; and this is true of every other part of the human body. The same law of proportion equally holds 8 in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to 9 know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form; wisdom. for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined.

There is an error common both to oligarchies and to 10 democracies: — in the latter the demagogues, when the multitude are above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just as in oligarchies, the oligarchs should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in 11 which they swear — 'I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them which I can;' but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling; in the form of their oath there should be an express declaration — 'I will do no wrong to the people.'

But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government; and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the 12 state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by

habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, V. 9. if the laws are democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in in-

13 dividuals. Now, to have been educated in the spirit what this of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which

the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a

14 revolution. And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the govern-

15 ment of the majority and freedom. Men think that what is just is equal ; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will ; and that freedom and equality mean the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides,

'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong ; men liberty is should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution ; for it is their salvation. *

I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance.

I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its destruction and preservation. What I have said already respecting other forms of government applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms; it is therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy differ in their very origin. The

* Cp. iv. 11. § 6. b Cp. Pl. Rep. viii. 556 n.

V. 10. appointment of a king is the resource of the better

Tyrannies classes against the people, and he is elected by them out

of their own number, because either he himself or his

(2) by dema- family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a

gogues, tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector

against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gained the favour of the people by their accusation of the notables. At any rate this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the

(3) by am- days when cities had increased in power. Others which bition; were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become (4) by ma- great despots. Others again grew out of the class which were gistrates; chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers. Examples of States. Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Peisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues. Royalty like the aristocracy. And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred. or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honour have benefitted, or had in

Cp. c. 5. § 6 ; Plato Rep. 565 D.

Retaining τούτοις, which is omitted in Bekker's second edition, apparently by mistake.

Cp. c. 5. § 8. Cp. iii. 14. § 12.

TYRANNY, OLIGARCHY, DEMOCRACY. 171

their power to benefit states and nations; some, like V. 10. Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war ; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings. The 1311a. idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, but only to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king,

10 honour. Wherefore also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries.

11 That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy Tyranny and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end is wealth ; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms, the nobles. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them

12 out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power ; and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this class, who either want to

13 rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulus to cut off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in other forms of government; subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because

they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property.

14 The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies,

Cp. c. 11. § 2. Cp. iii. 14. § 7. Cp. iii. 13. § 16.

Sometimes the office is attacked, sometimes the life of the monarch.

The latter when insult has been offered, as by the Peisistratidae,

whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. Monarchs have great wealth and honour which are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonour offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the attack for the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for his wife had been carried off by Evagoras' son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the attack of Crataeus upon Archelaus; he had always hated the connexion with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of Elymaea, when he was hard pressed in a war against Sirrhas and Arrhibaeus, and the younger to his own son Amyntas, under the idea that he would then be less likely to quarrel with the son of Cleopatra — Crataeus made this slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the king. And from a like motive Hellano- 18

CAUSED BY INSULT, FEAR, CONTEMPT. 173

crates of Larissa conspired with him ; for when Arche- V. 104 laus, who was his lover, did not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought that the connexion between them had originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of power. Parrhon, too, and Heracleides of Cotys. Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child.

19 Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mitylene, The Pen- Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthilidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been Penthilus. beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew

20 him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack ; Archelaus. he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged ; for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes.

21 Fear is another motive which has caused conspiracies Other as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders, — he being under the impression that Xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offence would be forgiven. Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sarda- Contempt. napalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the story-tellers say truly ; and the tale may

* Or : ' Many persons too, even of those connected with the government or the royal family,' taking τῶν περί, etc. with the subject.

V. 10. be true, if not of him, of some one else. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt ; for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. including The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt ; 24 of success the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus, again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired against Amadocus, whose general he was.

And sometimes men are actuated by more than one 25 motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.

Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success ; for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise from other causes. There are men who will not risk their 26 lives in the hope of gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honourable in the world ; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men ; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He must have the resolution of 28 Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying ' that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed ; such a death

would be welcome to him.' But this is a temper to which few can attain. 29 Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear ; for the two are

30 opposed in principle ; and all men, if they can, do what they will. Democracy is also antagonistic to tyranny,

on the principle of Hesiod, ' Potter hates Potter,' because they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny ; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well-governed.

31 Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within when the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that

of Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius ; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name. Whereupon the family conspired to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny ; but the party who conspired with them seized

32 the opportunity and drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people ; he afterwards perished himself.

There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies — hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction.

33 cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited have lost it, almost at once; for living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred,

Omitting cor' inserted by Bekker in 2nd ed. Cp. Plato Laws, iii. 695.

V. 10. and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even 34 more ready to strike — the angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not listen to reason. And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred 35 is more reasonable, but anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless.

In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as

destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy,

and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to

affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are

Royalty, only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly 36

lasting. rule is little affected by external causes, and is, therefore,

lasting; it is generally destroyed from within. And

from within. there are two ways in which the destruction may come

about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel 1313 a.

among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to

administer the state too much after the fashion of a

tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. 37

There are now no royalties; monarchies, where they exist,

are tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary

subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters;

but in our own day men are more upon an equality, and

Decline of no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to repre-

monarchy. sent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office.

Hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and

any one who obtains power by force or fraud is at once

Danger of thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies 338

|j! | . further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often

fall into contempt, and, although possessing not tyrannical

but only royal power, are apt to outrage others. Their

overthrow is then readily effected ; for there is an end to

the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but

the tyrant lasts, whether they like him or not. :

Omitting οἱ, with Bekker's 2nd ed.

PRESERVATION OF MONARCHIES. 177

The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to V. 16. these and the like causes.

And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. Royalty The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired ; for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways ; and they

2 are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians. And for a similar reason it has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting

basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain

3 sense not less, but greater. There is a story that when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he

had inherited from his father, 'No indeed,' he replied, 'for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting.'

4 As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have

been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration of their

5 government. There are also the ancient prescriptions for the preservation of a tyranny, in so far as this is possible;

viz. that the tyrant should lop off those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance

begets mutual confidence). Further he must compel the inhabitants to appear in public and live "at his gates"; then he will know what they are doing: if they are always kept under, they will learn to be humble. In short he should practise these and the like Persian and barbaric arts which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavour to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the 'female detectives' at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides money for the support of his guards, and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy; also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is. to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.

Or, 'at their doors.' Reading re with Bekker's 2nd ed.

This, which is probably the meaning of the passage, cannot be elicited from the text as it stands. The addition is required of

THE WAYS OF TYRANNY AND OF TYRANTS. 179

XI Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of V. 11. democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the Licence power given to women in their families in the hope that tyranny and they will inform against their husbands, and the licence democracy which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would fain

1 a be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honour; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has his humble 1314 a. companions who flatter him.

Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because The tyrant they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will demean himself by flattery; good men love others, but they do not flatter anybody.

13 Moreover the bad are useful for bad purposes; 'nail knocks out nail,' as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or inde- dislikes pendence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any independent one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as

4 an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him.

Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be Summary. summed up under three heads, which answer to the

15 three aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody: (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another; and this

some such phrase as αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλα, which is not wholly without manuscript authority.

V. II. is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men: (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles

them. Tyranny This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies 17 preserved in are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an opposite different principle of action. The nature of this latter 18 method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more The tyrant like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his like a king, subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives up power. this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their miserable earnings taken from them and lavished on courtezans and strangers and artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a

practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be the manager of a household rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is much more advantageous for the tyrant

when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one

accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place, he should appear to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not

with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he

inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a statesman, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offence against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe a like self-control and towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined

many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire their

happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should be especially moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked; not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the city

as state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less

V. II. disposed to conspire against him, because they believe

him to have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. he should honour men of merit, and make them think they would not be held in more honour by the

citizens if they had a free government. The honour he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to make one person

great; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If after all some one has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And if any one is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at once. The tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. He should be especially careful of his behaviour to men who are lovers of honour; for as the lovers of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of honour and the virtuous when their honour is affected. Therefore a tyrant ought either not to use force at all; or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon others, — and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of dishonour by the increase of honour. Of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive, if they effect their purpose. Therefore special precaution should be taken about any who think that either they or their relatives have been insulted; for when men are led away by passion to assault others they are regardless of themselves. As

Heracleitus says, 'It is difficult to fight against anger; for a man will buy revenge with life.' 32 And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule, and whichever of the two is stronger

he should attach to his government; for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens; either party added to the force which he already has, will make him stronger than his assailants.

33 But enough of these details; — what should be the general policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant,

but of the master of a household and of a king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life; he should be the companion of the notables,

34 and the hero of the multitude. For then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more lasting. Let his disposition be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and if he must be wicked, let him be half wicked only.

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon; this continued for a hundred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws; and in various ways gained the favour of the people by the care which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular, was respected for his military ability. If report may be believed, he crowned the judge who decided against him in the games;

Fragm. 69 (ed. Mullach). Cp. i. 5. § 2.

184 SHORT DURATION OF TYRANNIES.

V. 12. and, as some say, the sitting statue in the Agora of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. (A similar story is told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the Areopagus.) (2) The Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was that of the Cypselidae; Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six months: Cypselus reigned thirty years, Periander forty-four, and Psammetichus the son of Gordius three. Their continuance was due to similar causes: Cypselus was a popular man, who during the whole time of his rule never had a body-guard; and Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. (3) The Peisistra- Third in duration was the rule of the Peisistratidae at tidae; Athens, but it was interrupted; for Peisistratus was twice driven out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only seventeen; and his sons reigned eighteen — altogether thirty-five years. Of other tyrannies, that (4) of Hiero of Hiero and Gelo at Syracuse was the most lasting, and Gelo. The tyranny, however, was short, not more than eighteen 6 years in all ; for Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth ; Hiero reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration. *

I have now gone through all the causes by which 7 constitutional governments and monarchies are either 1316 destroyed or preserved. Plato's In the Republic of Plato Socrates treats of revolu-

of revolu- tions, but not well, for he mentions no cause of change tions criti- which peculiarly affects the first or perfect state. He only 8

(a) says that nothing is abiding, but that all things change the state in a certain cycle ; and that the origin of the change is a

plain the base of numbers which are in the ratio of four to three,

first decline; which when combined with a figure of five gives two

harmonies, — (he means when the number of this figure

becomes solid) ; he conceives that nature will then pro-

duce bad men who will not submit to education; in V. 12. which latter particular he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be 9 educated and made virtuous. But why is such a cause of (a) why change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather common decline to all states, nay, to everything which comes into being at all ? Or how is the state specially changed by the agency of time, which, as he declares, makes all things change? And things which did not begin together, change together; for example, if something has come into being the day before the completion of the cycle, it will change

10 with it. Further, why should the perfect state change into the Spartan? For governments more often take an opposite form than one akin to them. The same remark

is applicable to the other changes; he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this

11 into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny. And yet the contrary happens quite as often; for a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy than into

a monarchy. Further, he never says whether tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it changes. And the reason is, that he could not very well have told: for there is no rule; according to him it should revert to the first and best, and then there would be a complete cycle.

12 But in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny. but tyranny, as that at Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Cleisthenes; into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at Chalcis; into democracy, as that of Gelo did at Syracuse; into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the tyranny of Charilaus at Lacedaemon.

13 Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, like most

Placing a note of interrogation after ceraSaXXei. Or: 'And in the period of time which, as he says, makes all things change, things which did not begin together change together.'

Bekker in his 2nd edition has altered the reading of the MSS. dia ti ton chronon to dia gar ton chronon rendering of the text agrees with either reading; that of the note with the reading of the MSS. only.

V. 12. of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily; for example, the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panaetius; that at Gela into the tyranny of Cleander; that at Rhegium into the tyranny of Anaxilaus; the same thing has happened in many other states. And 14 it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into (6) Plato oligarchy merely because, [as Plato says] the ruling stands the class are lovers and makers of money, and not because 1316b. the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should into have an equal share in the government with themselves. Moreover in many oligarchies there are laws against making money in trade. But at Carthage, which is a democracy, there is no such prohibition; and yet to this day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It 15 is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the other of the poor. Is (7) which is not this just as much the case in the Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or in which all are not equally good men? Nobody need be any poorer than he was 16 states. before, and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a democracy, if the poor form the majority ; and a democracy may change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the other indifferent. Once more, although 17 (8) the causes of revolutions are very numerous, he mentions only one, which is, that the citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all, or the majority of them, were originally rich. This is not true : though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution ; but, when anybody else, it is no great matter. And an oligarchy 18 does not more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of government. Again, if men are deprived of the honours of state, and are wronged, and insulted,

Rep. viii. 550 E. Rep. viii. 551 D. Rep. viii. 555 D.

they make revolutions, and change forms of government, V. 12. even although they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked — of which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be the cause.

Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies (9) and he and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as confuses the though there were only one form of either of them. forms together