Book VI

Since, however, we have before observed that it is necessary the medium [in conduct] should be chosen, and neither excess nor deficiency, but the medium is [to act] as right reason prescribes, let us now consider what right reason is. For in all the above-mentioned habits, as in other things, there is a certain scope, to which he who possesses reason, looking, acts with intension and remission ; and there is a certain boundary of media, which we say are situated between excess and defect, and which exist conformably to right reason. Thus, to speak, however, is indeed true, but is not at all clear. For in Arist. VOL. II. N

Other pursuits, also, with which science is conversant, it is, indeed, true to say that it is not proper to labour either more or less, nor to be indolent, but to labour moderately, and as right reason prescribes. He, however, who alone knows this, will know nothing more; as, if on inquiring what kind of things are to be administered to the body, it should be said, they are such as medicine and he who possesses the medical art prescribe. Hence, it is necessary with respect to the habits of the soul, that this should not only be truly said, but that it should also be definitely shown what right reason is, and what is the definition of it. But we have distributed the virtues of the soul, and have said, that some of them are ethical, and others dianoetical [or belonging to the discursive power of the soul]. With respect to the ethical virtues, therefore, we have indeed discussed them; but with respect to the remaining virtues, these we shall discuss, after we have first spoken concerning the soul. It has, therefore, been before observed by us, that there are two parts of the soul, that which possesses reason, and that which is irrational. But now we shall make a division after the same manner of the part which possesses reason; and it must be admitted that there are two parts possessing reason; one, indeed, by which we survey those kind of beings, the principles of which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, and the other, by which we survey things of a contingent nature. For since the objects of knowledge are specifically different, it follows, that there are, also, different species of knowledge. For it is necessary that knowledge should be similar to the thing known, and that the knowledge of that which is necessary should be necessary, but contingent of that which is contingent. For all knowledge subsists accord-

ing to similitude and affinity, since it is a certain adaptation and contact of that which is known, and that which knows. But of these parts of the soul, the one is called scientific, but the other ratiocinative; for to consult and reason are the same thing. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do; so that the ratiocinative power is one certain part of the rational part of the soul. It must, therefore, be shown what is the best habit of each of these. For this is the virtue of each. But virtue is referred to its proper work.

There are, however, three things in the soul, which have dominion over action and truth, viz. sense, intellect, and appetite. But of these, sense is the principle of no one action; which is evident from this, that brutes have, indeed, sense, but have no communion with action [so as to have dominion over it]. What, however, affirmation and negation are in the discursive energy of the rational part, that pursuit and avoidance are in appetite.

For this pertains to beings who are capable of deliberate choice.

Hence, since ethical virtue is a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, but deliberate choice is an appetite adapted to consultation; hence, it is necessary that reason should be true, and the appetite right, if the deliberate choice is good, and that the one should assert, and the other pursue the same things. This discursive energy of the soul, therefore, [by which we judge that something is to be desired] is practical reason, and practical truth. But of the discursive energy of reason which is contemplative, and neither practiced nor effective, the good and the evil are truth and falsehood ; for this is the work of the whole of the discursive power. The work, however, of the practical, and at the same time discursive energy of reason, is truth subsisting in concord with right appetite. The principle, therefore, of action, whence motion is derived, is deliberate choice, though this principle is not the final cause of action. But appetite, and that reason which is for the sake of something, [or which is directed to the final cause] are the principles of deliberate choice. Hence, deliberate choice is not without intellect, and the discursive energy of reason ; nor is it without the ethical habit; for good conduct, and the contrary to it in action, are not without the discursive energy of reason and manners. The discursive energy, however, of reason itself, does not move anything, except that which is for the sake of something, and is practical ; since this has dominion over that which is effective. For every one who effects any thing, does it for the sake of something ; and that which is effected is not simply the end, but is a relative and pertains to something, though this is not the case with that which is practicable. For good conduct is the end of action ; but appetite is directed to the end. Hence, deliberate

choice is either orectic intellect, or appetite possessing a discursive energy ; and man is a principle of this kind. Nothing, however, that has been done is an object of deliberate choice. Thus, for instance, no one deliberately chooses to subvert Troy ; for neither does any one deliberate about what is past, but about that which is future and contingent. But it is not possible that what has been done should not be done. Hence, Agatho says rightly.

All things to God are possible but one, That to undo which is already done.

Of both the intellective parts, therefore, the work is truth. Hence, those habits according to which each of these parts enunciates the truth are the virtues of both.

Assuming, therefore, a more elevated exordium, let us again speak concerning these virtues. Let, therefore, the habits by which the soul enunciates truth in affirming or denying, be five in number. But these are art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellect; for it is possible that both hypolepsis and opinion may assert what is false. What

As dianoia is the discursive or syllogistic energy of the soul

Science therefore is, will be from hence evident, if it is necessary to investigate accurately, and not to follow similitudes. For all of us are of opinion that it is not possible for that which we know scientifically to subsist otherwise than it does. But with respect to things which may subsist otherwise, of these when they are out of our view we are ignorant whether they exist or not. The object of scientific knowledge, therefore, is from necessity. Hence, it is eternal. For all beings which are simply from necessity are eternal; but things eternal are without generation and incorruptible. Again, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of scientific knowledge may be obtained by discipline. But all doctrine is produced from things previously known, as we have said in the Analytics; for it partly subsists through induction, and partly from syllogism. Induction, therefore, is indeed a principle, and the principle of universal; but syllogism is from universal. The principles, therefore, from which syllogism consists, are things of which there is no syllogism. * Hence, they are obtained by induction. Science, therefore, is indeed a demonstrative habit, and such other things as we have added to the definition of it in the Analytics. For when a man believes that a thing is after a certain manner, and

hypolepsis is the assent of the soul to each term of a syllogistic process ; and opinion is the assent of the soul to the conclusion solely of a syllogism.

' Viz. So far as it excites the perception of the universal which is latent in the soul.

* Viz. The knowledge of them is not obtained by a syllogistic process.

* Viz. When he believes that the thing cannot subsist otherwise than it does.

the principles of it are known to him, he has a scientific knowledge of that thing. For if the principles are not more known to him than the conclusion, he will have a scientific knowledge from accident. Let these things, therefore, be admitted concerning science.

Of that, however, which may subsist otherwise than it does, [or which has a various subsistence, and is contingent,] there is something which is effective, and something which is practicable. But production and action differ. Credibility, however, may be obtained concerning these things from exoteric discussions; so that the practic habit in conjunction with reason, is different from the effective, or productive habit in conjunction with reason. And neither are they contained by each other; for neither is action effection; nor is effection action. But since the building art is a habit effective in conjunction with reason, and neither is there any art which is not a habit effective in conjunction with reason, nor any such habit which is not art; art and habit effective in conjunction with true reason will be the same. All art, however, is conversant with generation, and machinates and con-

templates in order that something may be produced which is capable either of existing, or not existing; and of which the principle is in the maker, but not in the thing made. For art neither belongs to things which necessarily are, or are necessarily generated, nor to things which have a natural subsistence; for these contain in themselves the principle. Since, however, production and action are different, it is necessary that art should pertain to production, but not to action. And after a certain manner, fortune and art are conversant with the same things, as, also, Agatho says.

Art fortune loves, and fortune art.

Art, therefore, as we have said, is a certain habit effective in conjunction with true reason. But the privation of art, on the contrary [or the inartificial habit,] is a habit effective in conjunction with false reason, about that which may have a various subsistence.

With respect to prudence, we shall apprehend what it is, if we survey who those are whom we denominate prudent persons. It appears, therefore, to be the province of a prudent man to be able to consult well about things which are good and advantageous to him, not partially, as about what contributes to health or strength, but about what universally contributes to a happy life. But this is indicated by our calling men prudent about any thing, when they reason well, with a view to some worthy end, in things in which there is no art. So that, in short, he who is adapted to consultation will be a prudent man. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things which it is impossible for him to perform. Hence, if science indeed subsists in conjunction with demonstration ; but of those things of which the principles may have a various subsistence, of these there is no demonstration ; for all these are contingent ; and if it is not possible to consult about things which subsist from necessity, prudence will neither be science nor art. It will not be science, because that which is practicable may have a various subsistence ; and it will not be art, because the genus of action is different from the genus of production. It remains, therefore, that it is a true habit

in conjunction with reason, practical about human good and evil. For the end of production indeed is different from the production, but the end of action is not always different from action. Hence we are of opinion that Pericles, and such like persons, are prudent men, because they are able to survey what is good for themselves, and for mankind ; and we also think that economists and politicians are persons of this description. Hence, also, we call temperance by this name, (σωφροσυνη), as preserving prudence (ως σωζουσα την φρονησιν). But it preserves an opinion of this kind. For the delectable and the painful do not corrupt or distort every opinion ; such as that a triangle has or has not angles equal to two right ; but those opinions which pertain to what is practicable. For the principles indeed of practicable things are those things for the sake of which they are performed. But to him who is corrupted through pleasure or pain, the principle is not immediately apparent, nor does he perceive, that for the sake of this, and through this, it is necessary to choose and perform all things. For vice is destructive of the principle. Hence it is necessary that prudence should be a habit in conjunction with true reason, practical about human good. Moreover, of art indeed there is a virtue, but of prudence there is not. And in art, indeed, he who voluntarily errs, is to be preferred to him who errs involuntarily ; but in prudence he who voluntarily errs is a subordinate character, in the same manner as in the virtues. It is evident, therefore, that prudence is a certain virtue, and not art. But since there are two parts of the rational soul, prudence will be the virtue of the doxastic part, [or that part which forms opinions of things]. For both opinion and prudence are conversant with that which may have a various subsistence.

Nor yet is prudence a habit alone in conjunction with reason; of which this is an indication, that there may be an oblivion of such a habit, [i. e. it may be lost through oblivion;] but there cannot be of prudence.

Since, however, science is an assent to universals and things which have a necessary subsistence, but there are principles of things demonstrable, and of every science; for science is accompanied with reason; this being the case, there will neither be science, nor art, nor prudence of the principle of the object of science. For the object of science is demonstrable; but art and prudence are conversant with things which may have a various subsistence; neither, therefore, will wisdom be that through which this principle is known; for it is the province of a wise man to have demonstration about certain things. Hence, if the habits by which we enunciate the truth, and are never deceived about things which cannot, or which can have a various subsistence, are science and prudence, wisdom and intellect, but no one of these three, can be the habit by which we know principles; but by the three, I mean prudence, wisdom, and science; it remains that intellect is the habit by which principles are known.

We attribute, however, wisdom in the arts, to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts. Thus we say that Phidias was a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here, therefore, we signify nothing else by wisdom, than that it is the virtue of art. But, in short, we think that certain persons are wise, not partially, and that they are not any thing else than wise men, as Homer says in his Margites,

The gods nor miner him, nor ploughman made; Nor wise in any thing beside;

so that it is evident that wisdom will be the most accurate of the sciences. Hence it is necessary that the wise man should not only know those things which are inferred from principles [or the conclusions of scientific reasoning,] but that he should also perceive and enunciate the truth about principles themselves. Wisdom, therefore, will be intellect and science, and will possess as a head [or summit] the science of the most honourable things, [i. e. of divine natures]. For it would be absurd for any one to fancy that the political science, or pru* dence, is a thing of all others the most excellent, unless

man is the best of every thing the world contains. * If, however, what is salubrious and good is to man one thing, and another to fishes, but that which is white and that which is straight are always the same/ all men will acknowledge that a wise man is the same, but the prudent man is a mutable character. For they will say that the being is prudent who surveys what is excellent in particulars according to the nature of each, and to him they will commit these particulars. Hence also they say that some brutes are prudent, viz. such as appear to have a providential power about what pertains to their life. It is evident, however, that the political science and wisdom are not the same. For if it should be ssud that wisdom is that which is conversant with what is useful to mankind, there will be many kinds of wisdom ; since there is not one science which is conversant with the good of all animals, but a different science is conversant with a different good ; unless indeed there is one medical science which extends to all beings. Nor is it of any consequence, if it should be said that man is the most excellent of all other animals ; Jbr there are martg animals naturally more divine than man^ such as those most ap-^ parent beingsjrom which the world is composed.^ From

* There are many, however, of the present day who are stupid enough to think that the world was made for roan ; and that maOt according to the rambling conceptions of Young, is

^ Midway from nothing to the deity. ^

* Vis. the colour which has the power of disprrnng iSatt sigh^ is ^dways white; and the line which is tlie shortest between two points, is always a right Hne.

' lieaning the stsurs, which, sccordmg to bodi Anstotle. says Plato, are divine animals. From this passage, and from what

what has been said, therefore, it is evident that wisdom is the science and intellect of things most honourable by nature. Hence the multitude say that Anaxagoras and Thales, and such-like persons, were indeed wise, but not prudent men, in consequence of perceiving that they were ignorant of what was advantageous to them [with respect to a corporeal life;] and they say, that they knew indeed things superfluous and admirable, difficult and divine, but which are useless, because they did not investigate human good. Prudence, however, is conversant with human affairs, and with those things which are the subjects of consultation; for we say that this is especially the work of a prudent man, to consult well. But no one consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things of which there is not a certain end, and this, practical good. He, however, simply consults well, who conjectures, by a reasoning process, what is best to man among practicable things. Nor is prudence only directed to universals, but it is also necessary that it should know particulars; for it is practical, but action is conversant with particulars. Hence, also, some persons who have only experimental knowledge without science, are more adapted for practical affairs, than those who possess a scientific knowledge [without experience]. For he who knows that light flesh is easily concocted, but is ignorant what

more largely said on this subject, by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Heavens, and in the 12th book of his Metaphysics, the audacity of those moderns is wonderful (if any thing pertaining to such men can be wonderful) who have asserted that Aristotle was not a polytheist, or a believer in the existence of divine beings, the immediate progeny of one first cause of all things, and who, as Maximus Tyrius says, "are the sons of God, ruling together with him."

flesh is light, will not produce health; but he will rather produce it who knows that the flesh of birds is light and salubrious. Prudence, however, is practical, so that it is necessary to possess both, [viz. a knowledge of what is to be done universally, and in particular circumstances,] or rather the latter than the former. But prudence here also [i. e. among the practical powers,] will be a certain architectonic power [or a power belonging to a master art.]

The political science, however, and prudence are indeed the same habit, though they have not the same essence. But of the science pertaining to a city, the one part which is legislative, is as it were architectonic prudence, but the other, in the same manner as particulars, is denominated by a common name, the political science. This, however, is practical, and occupied in consultation; for a decree is a thing practicable as the extreme. Hence those alone who possess the political science are said to act in a political capacity; for they alone act in the same manner as manual artificers. That also appears

' A decree (το ψηφισμα) may, as Aquinas observes, be called (το εσχατον) the extreme, because it is the application of a law universally established, to the performance of particulars.

to be especially prudence which a man employs about himself, and about one thing ; and this is called by a common name, prudence. But of these species of prudence, the one is economy, another legislation, and another the political science; and of this last, one part pertains to consultation, but another is judicial. For a man, therefore, to know his own concerns will be one species of knowledge. Nevertheless, it possesses a great difference. And he who knows things pertaining to himself, and is conversant with them, appears to be a prudent man ; but those who apply themselves to the management of public affairs, are busily employed in a multitude of concerns. Hence also Euripides says.

How can the name of wise to me belong. Who might have mingled in the martial throng ; Unvex'd with business, and exempt from care. Taking of spoils my honourable share ; Yet chose by over-anxious thought to move The direful hate of all-commanding Jove !

For these men explore what is good for themselves, and are of opinion that it is necessary to do this. From this opinion, therefore, it comes to pass that these men are prudent ; though perhaps it is not possible for a man to know his own concerns without economic and political prudence. Again, how a man ought to manage his own affairs, is a thing immanifest, and requires consideration. But as an indication of the truth of what has been said, a youth may become a geometrician and a mathematician, and may be skilled in things of this kind ; but it does not appear that he will be prudent. The cause, however, of this is, that prudence pertains to particulars which become known from experience ; but youth is

without experience, which is produced by length of time. Since this also deserves to be considered, why a boy may become a mathematician, but cannot be wise, or a physiologist ; shall we say it is because mathematical objects subsist by an ablation from matter; but the principles of the objects of wisdom and physiology are derived from experience ? And with respect to metaphysical principles indeed, youth do not believe in, but admit them ; but with respect to mathematical principles, it is not immanifest what they are. Farther still, error in consultation either pertains to universals, or particulars. For [in order that a man may not drink heavy, and therefore, bad water, it is requisite he should know,] either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular water is heavy. But it is evident that prudence is not science ; for it pertains to the extreme, as we have before observed ; since that which is practicable is a thing of this kind. It is, therefore, indeed opposed to intellect. For intellect is conversant with terms, [i. e. universals,] which are the extremes upward, and above which there are no other principles ; but prudence is conversant with the extremes downward [which are particulars,] of which there is no science, but only a sensible perception, and this not a sensible perception of peculiarities ; but such as that by which we perceive in mathematics that a triangle is the extreme ; for we stop there. It is, there-

' If it belongs to the mathematical science to demonstrate concerning things essentially inherent in triangle, and demonstration is of that which is universal, an individual and particular triangle, . so far as it is such, is not the object of science, but of sense. Yet it is not an object of sense, in the same manner as colour, or sound, or any thing else, of which some one of the senses forms a judgment, but as an individual particular thing. But that this is a sensible object, Aristotle shows by saying, " for we stop there. " For Arist VOL. II. O

fore, rather this sense which is prudence, but of this there is another species. *

To investigate, however, and to consult differ ; for to consult is to investigate something. But it is necessary to discuss good-consultation, and show what it is, whether it is a certain science, or opinion, or good-conjecture, or some other genus. It is not, therefore, science. For men do not investigate about things which they know ; but good-consultation is a certain consultation; and he who consults investigates and reasons. Neither is it good-conjecture ; for good-conjecture is without reasoning, and is something which is accomplished with celerity ; but men consult for a long time, and say that the objects of consultation ought to be performed rapidly, but that consultation should be done slowly. Again, sagacity and good-consultation also differ from each other ; but sagacity is a certain good-conjecture. Neither, there he who descends from universals, stops at particulars as the downward extremes.

* By this sense, Aristotle means the common sense, which is impartible, and is able to distinguish what it is in which contraries, and things of an heterogeneous nature, differ from each other ; but by that sense, he means any one of the partial senses, such as the sight, the hearing, &c.

fore, is good-consultation opinion. But since he who consults badly errs, but he who consults well consults rightly ; it is evident that good-consultation is a certain rectitude. Nor is good- consultation either science or opinion ; for of science, indeed, there is no rectitude, because there is no error ; but truth is the rectitude of opinion ; and at the same time every thing of which there is an opinion is definite and determined. Nevertheless good-consultation is not without reasoning. It falls short, therefore, of dianoia [or the discursive energy of reason ;] for this is not yet enunciation ; since opinion is not investigation, but is now a certain enunciation. He, however, who consults, whether he consults well or ill, investigates something and reasons; But good-consultation is a certain rectitude of consultation; on which account, it must in the first place be inquired what consultation is, and with what it is conversant.

Since, however, rectitude is multifariously predicated, it is evident that not every rectitude is good-consultation. For the incontinent and the bad man, obtain from reasoning that which they propose to see ; so that they will have consulted rightly, but have procured for themselves a great evil. But to have consulted well, appears to be a certain good ; for such a rectitude of consultation, as becomes the mean of obtaining good, is good consultation. Good, however, may be obtained by false reasoning ; and a man indeed may obtain that which ought to be done, yet not through a proper medium, but the middle term may be false. Hence, neither will that be

' As when a man steals in order to relieve a worthy person in distress. But as he who proves a true conclusion through false pre-

good-consultation according to which that is obtained which ought to be obtained, yet not through a proper medium. Farther still, it is possible that one man may obtain the object of his wishes by consulting for a long time, but another, by consulting rapidly. Hence neither is that yet good-consultation ; but the rectitude which subsists according to utility, and to what is proper, and as, and when it is proper. Again, it is possible simply to consult well, and also with a view to a certain end. Good consultation, therefore, simply is that which proceeds with rectitude to an end simply ; but a certain good consultation, is that which proceeds with rectitude to a certain end. Hence, if to consult well is the province of prudent men, good consultation will be a rectitude according to utility with a view to a certain end, of which prudence is the true hypothesis.

INTELLIGENCE, however, and the privation of intelligence, according to which we denominate men intelligent or unintelligent, is neither wholly the same with science or opinion ; for if it were, all men would be intelligent.

mises does not reason well ; so he who, in order to obtain a good end, assumes a bad medium, does not consult well.

Nor is intelligence some one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, for it would be conversant with health ; or geometry, for it would be conversant with magnitudes. For neither is intelligence conversant with things which always are, and are immoveable, nor with things which are passing into existence ; but with those which may be the subject of doubt and consultation. Hence it is conversant with the same things as prudence ; yet intelligence and prudence are not the same. For prudence, indeed, is of a commanding nature ; for the end of it is, what ought, or what ought not to be done. But intelligence is alone of a judiciary nature. For intelligence is the same as right intelligence ; since intelligent men are also rightly intelligent. Intelligence, however, is neither the possession, nor the acquisition of prudence. But as he who learns is said to understand what he learns, when he uses science, the like also takes place in the use of opinion in forming a judgment of those things with which prudence is conversant, and judging of them well, when another person is speaking. For what is well is the same with what is beautifully done. And hence the name intelligence was derived, according to which men are said to be rightly intelligent, viz. from intelligence in learning; for we frequently use the verb to learn as equivalent to the verb to understand.

But what is called upright decision, according to which we say that men decide rightly, is the right judgment of the equitable man. As an indication of this, however. We say that the equitable man is especially inclined to pardon others, and that it is equitable to pardon certain things. But pardon is an upright judiciary decision of the equitable man ; and the decision is upright which is made by a man observant of truth. All these habits, however, reasonably tend to the same thing. For we speak of upright decision, intelligence, prudence, and intellect with reference to the same persons, when we say that they are men of upright decision, are endued with intellect, are prudent and intelligent. For all these powers pertain to the extremes [downward,] and to particulars. And an intelligent man, and one who decides rightly, or a man disposed to pardon, will be one who possesses a judiciary power about things with which the prudent man is conversant; for things of an equitable nature are common to all good men, in their intercourse with others. Every thing, however, of a practicable nature pertains to particulars, and the [downward] extremes. For it is necessary that a prudent man should have a knowledge of these ; and intelligence and equitable decision are conversant with things of a practicable

Extreme ; but these are extremes. And intellect pertains both to the upward and downward extremes. For intellect, and not the discursive energy of reason, is conversant with both first and last terms, [i. e. with universal principles ;] the one indeed, i. e. the intellect, which is the principle of the demonstrative sciences, is conversant with immutable and first terms ; but the intellect, which is occupied in practical affairs, [or which is the principle of prudence,] is conversant with the extreme, and with that which is contingent, and the other proposition. * For these are the principles of that for the sake of which a thing is done [or the final cause ;] for universal is from particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have a sensible perception ; but this is [the practical] intellect. Hence, these [habits] appear to be natural. And no one indeed is wise by nature ; but every one possesses naturally the power of deciding rightly, together with intelligence and intellect. But as an indication of this, we are of opinion that these habits are attendants on the ages of the life of men ; and we say that this age [i. e. old age] possesses intellect and upright decision, as if nature were the cause of this. Hence, also, intellect is both the principle and the end ; for from these demonstrations are framed, and with these they are conversant.

* I. e. It assents to certain immediate particulars, which are assumed as minor propositions, in order to produce the particular conclusions of prudence, through which what is here and now to be done, is inferred.

* i. e. The practical intellect is both the principle and the end of practical demonstrations. For the principles of practical demonstrations are things from which it is concluded what is to be done ; but the end is good, which is proposed as a thing to be obtained through actions.

Hence, [in practical affairs] it is no less necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of elderly or prudent men, than to demonstrations ; for in consequence of possessing an eye from experience, they perceive the principles [of things of a practicable nature]. And thus we have shown what wisdom and prudence are, and with what particulars each is conversant, and that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

Some one, however, may doubt concerning these, in what their utility consists. For wisdom, indeed, contemplates none of those things from which men will obtain felicity ; since it is not conversant with any thing which is in generation, [or which is becoming to be, or passing into existence]. But prudence, indeed, does consider those things from which human felicity is derived ; yet on what account is it necessary that it should, since prudence is conversant with just and beautiful things, and which are good to man ? We do not, however, become at all more practically virtuous by knowing these things, since the virtues are habits ; as neither are things said to be salubrious, or to conduce to a good habit of body, because they have an active power, but

because they proceed from habit. For we are not at

all more practical, from possessing the medical or gym-

nastic art. But if a man is not to be considered as

prudent for the sake of these things, but for the sake of

becoming worthy, they will not be at all useful to those

who are worthy. Again, neither will prudence be use-

ful to those who are not worthy ; for it is of no conse-

quence whether they are prudent, or are persuaded by

others that are ; once this will be sufficient, in the same

manner as in what pertains to health. For when we wish

to be well, we do not at the same time learn the medical

art. To which we may add, that it will appear to be

absurd, that prudence, which is subordinate to wisdom,

should possess a greater authority; for that which is

effective, governs and presides in every thing. These

things, therefore, must be discussed, for now the doubt is

concerning them alone. In the first place, therefore,

we say, that these virtues [wisdom and prudence] are

necessarily eligible per se, since they are the virtues of

each part of the soul, though neither of them should

effect any thing. In the next place, they do indeed effect

something, yet not in the same manner as medicine pro-

duces health ; but as health produces the energies of a

good habit of body, thus also wisdom produces felicity.

For being a part of the whole of virtue, by the possession

and the energy of it, it renders a man happy. Farther

still, the work is accomplished by prudence and ethical

virtue. For virtue renders the scope proposed by the

agent right ; but prudence gives rectitude to things which

tend to the scope. A virtue, however, of this kind,

does not belong to the fourth, or nutritive part of the

* viz. Wisdom is the Virtue of the contemplative, and prudence of the practical intellect.

soul, because its energies are not in our power, [nor are they prudential either essentially or by participation.] But with respect to our not being at all more adapted to the practice of things beautiful and just, through prudence, [in answer to this objection] we must begin a little higher, assuming the following principle: — For as we say that certain persons who perform just things, are not yet just, such as those who do what is ordered by the laws, either unwillingly, or from ignorance, or from some other cause, and not on account of the things themselves, though they do those things which ought to be done, and such as a worthy man ought to do; thus also, as it seems, it is possible to do every thing with a certain disposition of mind, so as to be a good man. I mean for instance, that it is possible to do every thing [with which virtue is concerned] from deliberate choice, and for the sake of the things which are done. Virtue, therefore, produces a right deliberate choice; but it is not the business of virtue, but of some other power, to render the deliberate choice disposed to embrace what truly contributes to the end.

It is requisite, however, to speak more clearly on this subject. There is, therefore, a certain power which is called skill. But this is a power of such a kind, that by its assistance those things may be performed and obtain- ed, which contribute to the proposed scope. And if, indeed, the scope is beautiful, this power is laudable; but if the scope is bad, this power becomes craft: on which account, also, we say that prudent men are skilful, and

I was under the necessity here of paraphrasing the words of Aristotle, in order to render his meaning intelligible.

not crafty. Prudence, however, is not this power, yet does not subsist without it. But habit is not acquired by this eye of the soul without virtue, as we have said, and is evident. For the syllogisms of practical affairs rank as a principle; since the end is a thing of this kind, and that which is best, whatever it may be. Let the end, for instance, be something casual ; but this is not apparent except to a good man. For depravity distorts [the judgment,] and produces deception about the practical principles. Hence it is evident, that it is impossible for any one to be a prudent, unless he is a good man.

Again, therefore, let us direct our attention to virtue. For as prudence is not the same, indeed, but is similar to sagacity, thus, also, natural virtue subsists similarly, with reference to that which is properly so called. For the several manners appear to all men to subsist in a certain respect naturally ; since we are just, and temperate, and brave, and possess the other virtues immediately from our birth. At the same time, however, we investigate something else, as that which is properly good, and are of opinion that such-like virtues are inherent after another manner. For the physical habits are inherent

in children and brutes ; but they are seen to be noxious without intellect. Thus much, indeed, is apparent, that as it happens that a strong body, which is moved without sight, very much errs in its motions, in consequence of being deprived of sight ; this, likewise, is the case here [with respect to the physical virtues. ] But if the possessor of these virtues obtains intellect, also, he will excel in his actions. The habit, however, being similar, will then be properly virtue. Hence, as in the doxastic part of the soul, [or that part which is characterised by opinion,] there are two species, skill and prudence ; thus, also, in the ethical part, there are two species, one of which is physical virtue, but the other is virtue properly so called. And of these, virtue properly so called, is not without prudence. Hence, it is said, that all the vir-

' In the physical virtues, which are the forerunners of the other virtues, the possession of the senses in perfection, and especially of the most honourable of the senses, the sight and hearing, may be called corporeal prudence. In the second place, corporeal strength may be denominated corporeal fortitude. In the third place, corporeal beauty may be called corporeal temperance. For as temperance consists in the symphony and consent of the parts of the soul, so beauty in the body consists in a certain symmetry of its organical parts. And in the fourth place, health may be called corporeal justice. For justice is that habit which keeps the parts of the soul free from sedition; and health is that which produces concord and arrangement among the disorderly elements of the body.

These physical virtues are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament; or that they are the result of energies in a former life.

tues are prudences. And Socrates, indeed, investigated partly with rectitude, and partly with error. For because he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he erred; but it is well said by him, that the virtues are not without prudence. But as an indication of this, all men now, when they define virtue add to the definition habit, and that they energise according to right reason. And right reason is that which subsists according to prudence. All men, therefore, appear in a certain respect to prophesy, that a habit of this kind, which subsists according to prudence, is virtue. It is necessary, however, to change, in a small degree, the definition; for not only a habit according to right reason, but also a habit in conjunction with right reason, is virtue. But prudence is right reason energizing about things of this kind. So-

Socrates, in the Republic of Plato, calls the virtues prudences or sciences, because the energies of all the virtues are according to right reason. Hence, he gives them this appellation, from the better and superior part of the soul, just as we denominate man simply a rational animal, though he contains both rational and irrational powers. But we thus denominate him, because his irrational powers are in a certain respect rendered rational, by being obedient to reason, and because it is more appropriate to denominate him from the more excellent and ruling part. Hence, there is no real disagreement between Socrates and Aristotle, in what is here said of the virtues ; the former denominating them according to what is the characteristic of their essence ; but the latter considering the virtues, and that which characterises them, as different things.

"A man performs something according to reason, both when he is excited by another, and when he regards the end, in the same manner as nature produces according to reason ; but he acts in conjunction with reason, when he acts from knowledge ; and regarding the end, operates according to reason." Paraphrase on the

crates therefore thought, that the virtues, indeed, were reasons ; because all of them are sciences ; but we think that they subsist in conjunction with reason. Hence, it is evident, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be a good man, properly, without prudence ; nor a prudent man without ethical virtue. After this manner also, the reasoning may be dissolved, by which some one may contend, that the virtues are separated from each other ; for the same person is not naturally well adapted to all the virtues. Hence, he has now obtained this, but not yet that virtue ; for this may, indeed, happen according to the physical virtues, but is not possible in those virtues, according to which a man is said to be simply a good man. For all the virtues are present, at the same time that prudence, which is one virtue, is present. But it is evident, that though prudence were not a practical thing, it would be necessary, because it is the virtue of a part of the soul, and because deliberate choice will not be right without prudence, nor without virtue ; for one of these is the end, but the other causes us to do things which contribute to the end. Prudence, however, neither has dominion over wisdom, nor over the better part of the soul, as neither has the medical science dominion over health ; for it does not use health, but considers how it may be obtained. It prescribes, therefore, for the sake of health, but has no dominion over it. Again, to say that prudence rules over wisdom, is just as if some one should say, that the political science rules over the gods, because it orders every thing which is done in the city.