Book VIII

AFTER these things, it follows that we should discuss friendship; for it is a certain virtue, or subsists in conjunction with virtue. And besides this, it is most necessary to life; for no one would choose to live without friends, though he possessed every other good. For the rich, princes, and magistrates, appear to be especially in want of friends. For what advantage is there in a prosperity of this kind, if beneficence is taken away, which is especially exerted towards friends, and is most praised when thus exerted? Or how can prosperity be preserved and saved, without friends? For by how much

the greater, by so much the more insecure it is. But in poverty and other misfortunes, friends are considered to be the only refuge. Friendship, also, is useful to youth, in preventing them from error, and to elderly men, by the attention which it pays to their wants, and the assistance it affords to their deficiency in action, arising from the imbecility of age. To those likewise in the acme of life it is useful, because it aids them in the performance of beautiful actions.

For they are more able through it both to conceive and act. Friendship, also, appears to be naturally inherent in that which begets towards that which is begotten; and this not only in the human race, but likewise in birds, in most animals, in those of the same nation towards each other, and especially among men; and hence, we praise those that are philanthropic. It may also be seen, in travelling, how accommodating and friendly every man is to man. It seems, too, that friendship connects cities together; and legislators pay more attention to it than to justice. For concord appears to be something similar to friendship; but this legislators are especially desirous of effecting, and they principally expel sedition, which is hostile to concord. And when the citizens, indeed, are friends, there is no need of justice; but though they are just, they require friendship. Among just things, also, that which is especially just, appears to be of a friendly nature. Nor is friendship alone necessary, but it is also a beautiful thing. For we praise those who are

' A hemistich of Homer, Iliad, 10. v. 224, and so known as to become proverbial. *

lovers of friends; and an abundance of friends, appears to be one among the number of beautiful things. Again, some are of opinion that the same persons are good men and friends. There is, however, no small controversy concerning friendship. For some consider it to be a certain similitude, and that similar persons are friends; whence, also, it is said "like tends to like, a jackdaw to a jackdaw," &c. Others on the contrary say, that all such persons are potters to each other. And they investigate concerning these things from a higher and more physical origin; Euripides, indeed, saying.

Earth, when she's dry, rejoices in the rain; And venerable heav'n, with rain when fill'd, On earth delights to fall.

And Heraclitus asserting "that what is adverse is advantageous; that the most beautiful harmony results from things of a different nature; and that all things originate from strife." Others, however, are of a contrary opinion respecting friendship, and among these is Empedocles. For he says, "that the similar aspires after the similar." Such of these doubts, therefore, as are of a physical nature we shall omit; for they are not adapted to the present speculation. But we shall direct our attention to such of them as pertain to human affairs, and to the manners and passions of men; such as, whether there

Alluding to the following verse of Hesiod, which gave rise to the above-mentioned proverb:

i.e. "The potter envies the potter, and the carpenter the carpenter."

is friendship among all men, or it is not possible that depraved men can be friends? And whether there is one, or many species of friendship? For those who are of opinion that there is but one species of it, because it receives the more and the less, do not found their opinion on a sufficient argument. For things specifically different receive the more and the less: but of these we have spoken before.

These things, however, will perhaps become evident, when that which is the object of friendly love is known; for it seems that not every thing is beloved, but that only which is the object of love; but this is either what is good, or what is delectable, or what is useful. That, however, may appear to be useful through which some good or pleasure is procured. Hence, the good and the delectable will be objects of love, as ends. Whether, therefore, do men love that which is [simply] good, or that which is good to them ? For these sometimes are discordant. A similar inquiry, also, may be made concerning the delectable. It appears, however, that every one loves that which is good to himself; and that good is that which is simply the object of love, but that what

is good to each person, is the object of love to each. Each person, however, loves not that which is really good to him, but that which appears to be so. But this makes no difference ; for that which appears to be good, will be the object of love. Since, however, there are three things through which love is produced, [viz. the good, the delectable, and the useful,] in the love of things inanimate there is not said to be friendship ; for there is no reciprocal love, nor a wish that any good may befal them. For it would be perhaps ridiculous to wish that some good might befal wine ; but if a man does, he wishes that it may be preserved, in order that he may have it. But it is said to be requisite to wish well to a friend for his own sake ; and those who entertain this wish for their friends, are said to be benevolent, though the same wish should not be made by them. For it is said that benevolence, in reciprocal regard, is friendship ; to which perhaps it should be added, if the benevolence is not latent. For many persons are benevolent to those whom they never saw, in consequence of believing them to be worthy or useful men. And those whom they never saw may also be benevolent to them. They appear, therefore, indeed, to be benevolent to each other ; but how can it be said that they are friends, when they are ignorant of the manner in which they are mutually affected ? Hence, it is necessary, in order to their being friends, that they should be benevolent to, and wish well to each other, on account of one of the things we have mentioned, [viz. on account of the good, the delectable, or the useful.]

These, however, are specifically different from each other; and, therefore, the loves also, and the friendships differ. For there are three species of friendship, equal in number to the objects of friendly love; since in each there is a reciprocal love which is not latent. But those who love each other, wish well to each other, so far as they love. Those, therefore, who love each other on account of utility, do not mutually love for their own sake, but so far as they obtain some good from each other. This is also the case with those who love on account of pleasure. For they do not love those who are versatile, because they possess certain qualities, but because they afford them pleasure. And those who love on account of utility, possess this friendly love on account of the good which they derive from it. Those, likewise, who love on account of pleasure, love on account of that which is delectable to them. And the attachment of these is not personal, but is produced so far as the object of their attachment is useful or delectable. These friendships, therefore, are accidental; for the object of their attachment is not beloved, so far as he is such a person as he is, but so far as he administers to them some good, or some pleasure. Such friendships,

therefore, are easily dissolved, the objects of them not remaining in a similar condition; for if they are no longer delectable or useful, they cease to be beloved. And the useful is not permanent, but at a different time becomes different. choice, that through which they were friends being dissolved, their friendship also is dissolved, in consequence of existing for the sake of it. A friendship, however, of this kind, appears especially to subsist among elderly men ; for those who have arrived at this period of life, do not pursue the delectable, but the useful ; nor is the delectable pursued by such young men in the acme of life, as make utility the object of their pursuit. But such persons do not very much live together ; for sometimes they are not pleasing to each other. They do not, therefore, require an association of this kind, unless they are useful ; for they are delectable to each other so far as they hope for some good. Among these friendships, also, [viz. those of utility,] hospitable friendship is ranked. But the friendship of young men appears to subsist on account of pleasure ; for they live according to passion, and especially pursue that which is delectable to them, and that which is present. In consequence of the mutation of age, however, other things become delectable ; on which account they rapidly become and cease to be friends. For their friendship is changed together with that which is delectable. But the mutation of such a pleasure is rapid. Young men also are amorous ; for much of the amatory propensity subsists according to passion, and on account of pleasure. Hence they love, and rapidly cease to love, frequently changing in the same day. They wish, however, to spend the day with each other, and to live together ; for thus they obtain what friendship requires. The

friendship, however, of good men, and of those who are similar in virtue, is perfect ; for they similarly wish well to each other, so far as they are good ; but they are good of themselves. But those who wish well to their friends for their sake, are especially friends ; for they are thus affected towards them on their own account, [i. e. personally,] and not from accident. The friendship, therefore, of these remains as long as they are good men ; but virtue is stable. And each of these is simply good, and good to his friend ; for good men are simply good, and are useful to each other. In a similar manner, also, they are delectable to each other ; for good men are simply and mutually delectable. For to each their proper actions, and such-like actions, [viz. such as are similarly virtuous,] are attended with pleasure. But the actions of good men are such as these, or resemble them. It reasonably follows, also, that such a friendship is stable ; for all such things subsist in it connectedly as ought to be present with friends. For all friendship is on account of good, or on account of pleasure, either simply, or to him who loves, and this according to a certain similitude. But in this friendship [i. e. in the friendship founded on virtue] all the above-mentioned particulars are essentially inherent ; since in this all the rest are similar, and that which is simply good is also simply delectable. These things, however, are especially lovely ; and in these the most excellent love and friendship principally subsist. But it is likely that such friendships are rare; for persons of this description are few. Farther still, virtuous friendship requires time and custom; for according to the proverb, it is not possible for men to know each other till they have eaten a peck of salt together. Nor is it proper for one person to become inti-

make friends, or a friend to another, till he appears to be amiable to him, and worthy of belief. But those who rapidly perform towards each other the offices of friendship, wish indeed to be friends, but are not, unless they are amiable, and know that they are so. They rapidly, therefore, contract the wish to be friends, but they do not contract friendship. Hence, virtuous friendship is perfect according to time, [as being lasting,] and according to other things, and consists from all these. Each friend, likewise, is in this friendship similar to each, which is a thing necessary to friends.

The friendship, however, which subsists on account of the delectable, has a similitude to virtuous friendship ; for good men also are delectable to each other. This is likewise the case with the friendship which subsists on account of utility ; for good men are also such [i. e. useful] to each other. But among these [viz. those who are friends through the delectable] friendships are especially permanent, when an equality, as for instance, of pleasure subsists between them. And not only so, but likewise from the same thing, as is the case with men of versatile manners, and not as between the lover and the

beloved person. For these are not delighted with the same things, but the lover is delighted with [the sight of] the beloved person, and he who is beloved is delighted with the attention which is paid him by the lover. When the flower of age, however, is no more, sometimes the friendship also ends. For to the one the sight of his friend is no longer pleasing, and to the other bland attention is no longer paid. Many of these, however, continue permanent in their friendship, if each loves the manners of each from custom, in consequence of possessing similar manners. Those, however, who do not reciprocally exchange delight in amatory affairs, but uti- lity, are friends in a less degree, and their friendship is less permanent. But the friendship of those who are friends on account of utility, is dissolved together with advantage ; for they were not friends of each other, but of the profitable. On account of pleasure, therefore, and on account of utility, it is possible for bad men to be friends to each other, and also for worthy with bad men, and for those who are neither good nor bad with each other, and with the good or the bad ; but it is evident that the good alone can be friends through or on account of themselves. For bad men are not delighted with each other, unless each derives some advantage from the other. And the friendship of good men alone is unattended with calumny ; for it is not easy to believe any thing [bad] of him, who has been tried by us for a long time. Among these also there is mutual credibility, and a confidence that the one will not injure the other, and such other particulars as are thought worthy to be ranked in the friendship. In other friendships, however, there is nothing to prevent things of this kind from taking place. For since men denominate friends those who are con-

nected together on account of utility, in the same manner as cities (for to cities warlike confederacies appear to take place for the sake of advantage) ; and since those likewise are called friends who like boys love each other on account of pleasure, perhaps, indeed, it is necessary that we also should call such persons friends, and should admit that there are many species of friendship. And we must denominate, indeed, the friendship of good men so far as they are good, that which is primarily and properly so called ; but we must admit that the rest are called friendships from similitude. For they are friends so far as there is something good and similar among them; since the delectable is something good to the lovers of pleasure. These friendships, however, are not very much conjoined, nor do the same persons become friends on account of the useful and the delectable ; for things which are from accident are not very much united. But friendship being distributed into these species, bad men, indeed, will be friends on account of pleasure or advantage, through which they are similar; but good men will be friends on their own account; for they are friends so far as they are good. These, therefore, are simply friends ; but those from accident, and from being assimilated to these.

As, however, in the virtues, some men are said to be good according to habit, but others according to energy, thus also it is in friendship. For those friends who live together are delighted with, and impart good to each other; but those who are asleep, or are separated by places, do not indeed energize, and yet they are so disposed as to be able to energize in such a way as friendship requires. For places do not dissolve friendship simply, but only the energy of it. If, however, the absence is long, it seems to produce an oblivion of friendship ; whence it is said, that taciturnity dissolves many friendships. But neither elderly nor austere men appear to be adapted to friendship ; for in them there is but little of pleasure. No one, however, can constantly associate with one who is sorrowful, or with one who is not pleasant. For nature appears especially to avoid the painful, and to aspire after the pleasing. But those who admit the company of each other, and yet do not live together, rather resemble benevolent persons than friends; since nothing is so much the province of friends as living together. For those who are in want aspire after advantage. Those, also, who are blessed constantly associate with each other ; for it is not in the smallest degree fit

that these should lead a solitary life. But it is not possible for men to live together whose company is not delightful, and who are not pleased with the same things, which fellowship appears to possess. The friendship, therefore, of good men is eminently friendship, as we have frequently observed. For that which is simply good or delectable, appears to be lovely and eligible ; but to every one that is lovely and eligible which is to him a thing of this kind. A good man, however, is lovely and eligible to a good man through both these. Dilection, however, is similar to passion, but friendship to habit ; for dilection is no less exerted towards inanimate things. But reciprocal love exists in conjunction with deliberate choice; and deliberate choice is from habit. We, likewise, wish well to those whom we love for their own sake, not according to passion, but according to habit. And those who love a friend, love that which is good to themselves ; for a good man becoming a friend, becomes a good to him to whom he is a friend. Each, therefore, loves that which is good to himself, and they mutually impart to each other that which is equal, both in wishing well and affording delight ; for equality is said to be friendship. But these things are especially present with the friendship of good men.

300 THE NICOMACHEAN BOOK VIII.

Friendship, however, subsists in a less degree among austere and elderly men, in proportion as they are more morose, and less delighted with associations; for these appear to be especially friendly, and effective of friendship. Hence, young men rapidly become friends, but not elderly men ; for they do not become friends to those with whom they are not delighted. In a similar manner neither do the austere become rapidly friends. But men of this description are indeed benevolent to each other; for they wish well, and afford assistance to the wants of each other. They are not, however, very much friends, because they do not constantly associate, nor are delighted with each other ; which things appear to be especially of a friendly nature. But it is not possible to be a friend to many, according to perfect friendship, as neither is it possible to love many at one and the same time ; for this resembles excess ; and a thing of this kind is naturally adapted to take place towards one person. Moreover, it is not easy for many persons to please the same person very much at one and the same time, nor perhaps would it be a good thing if it were easy. Experience and custom, likewise, are necessary [to a per-

fect friendship], which are very difficult things. But it is possible to please many persons, on account of utility and delight ; for there are many of this description, [viz. who are thus to be pleased], and a little experience is sufficient for this purpose. Of these two, however, the friendship which subsists through the delectable is more similar [to true friendship,] when the same things are effected by both persons, and they are delighted with each other, or with the same things ; as is the case in the friendships of young men ; for there is more of the liberal in these friendships. But the friendship which subsists on account of utility, is the friendship of merchants, [and of those who are occupied in sordid and illiberal pursuits]. And those who are blessed, indeed, [viz. who are as happy as the condition of human nature will permit,] are not in want of any thing useful or delectable, [because they already possess every thing of this kind]. For they wish to live with certain persons ; and they endure what is painful but for a short time ; since no one could endure it continually, not even good itself, if it were attended with molestation. Hence, they search for friends who can procure them delight. It is, however, perhaps necessary to search for good men who are such, [i. e. who are delectable,] and who are also such to their friends ; for thus those things will be present with them, which ought to be present with friends. But men in authority and power, appear to use their friends by making a distinction between them ; for some are useful, and others delectable to them. The same things, however, are not very much effected by both these. For neither do they search for those who are delectable in conjunction with virtue, nor for those who are useful for worthy purposes ; but aspiring after pleasure, they search

for men of versatile manners, and for those who are skilful in accomplishing what they are ordered to do. But these qualifications are not very much found in the same person. We have, however, already observed, that the worthy man is at the same time pleasing and useful. But such a one will not be the friend of the man who surpasses others in power and authority, unless he also surpasses others in virtue ; but if he does not, he who surpasses will not equalize according to the analogous. Men of this description, however, are rare. The abovementioned friendships, therefore, are in equality. For either the same things are effected by both, and they mutually wish the same things, or they exchange one thing for another, as for instance, pleasure for utility. But that these are friendships in a less degree, and that they are less permanent, has been already observed by us. They appear, however, through a similitude and dissimilitude of the same thing, to be and not to be friendships. For from their similitude to the friendship which is according to virtue, they appear to be friendships ; since the one of these has the delectable, but the other the useful. But. both these are inherent in virtuous friendship. They differ, however, in this, that virtuous friendship is free from calumny, and is stable ; but these are rapidly changed, and they also differ in many other things. And from this dissimilitude to the friendship which is according to virtue, they do not appear to be friendships.

There is, however, another species of friendship, which subsists according to transcendency ; such as that between a father and his son, and in short between a more elderly and a younger man, between a husband and his wife, and between every governor and him who is governed. But these friendships, also, differ from each other. For there is not the same friendship between parents and children, as there is between governors and the governed ; nor between a father and son, as between a son and his father ; nor between a husband and wife, as between a wife and husband. For the virtue and also the work of each of these are different ; and the things are different on account of which they love. Their loves, therefore, and their friendships are different. Hence, neither are the same things effected by each towards each, nor is it fit they should be required. But when children, indeed, bestow on their parents those things which offspring ought to bestow on those by whom they were begotten, and parents bestow on their children those things which it is proper to bestow on their offspring, then the friendship between such as these will be stable and worthy. It is, however, necessary in all the friendships which subsist according to transcen-

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dency, that the love should be analogous; as, for instance, that the better character should be beloved in a greater degree than he loves, and that this should also be the case with the more useful character, and in a similar manner with each of the rest. For when love exists according to desert, then in a certain respect equality is produced; which appears to be the peculiarity of friendship. The equal, however, does not appear to subsist similarly in just things and in friendship. For in just things, indeed, the equality which is according to desert, ranks in the first place; but that which is according to quantity in the second place. But in friendship, the equality which is according to quantity, ranks in the first place, and that which is according to desert in the second place. This, however, becomes evident if there is a great interval of virtue or vice, or affluence, or of some other things; for then they are no longer friends, nor do they think themselves qualified to be so. But this is most apparent in the gods; for they most abundantly transcend in every thing that is good. It is also evident in kings; for those who are much inferior to them, do not think themselves wor-

* A good man, in consequence of being similar to, may be said to be the friend of, divinity; but then as from the transcendency of the divine nature, there is no reciprocation of similitude, when it is also said that God is the friend of good men, nothing more is to be understood by this assertion, than that divinity is participated by him through proximity, alliance and aptitude, as much as is possible to human nature. And in this way, the following beautiful passage of Diogenes must be understood: — "All things are the possessions of the gods; good men are the friends of the gods; and friends have all things in common. It is impossible, therefore, that a man beloved by the gods should not be happy, or that a wise and just man should not be beloved by the gods."

thy to be their friends. Nor do those who are of no worth aspire to be friends of the best or the wisest of men. In such as these, therefore, there is no accurate definition, as long as they are the friends of some one. For many things being taken away, the friendship may yet remain; but if they are separated by a great interval from each other, as is the case with man and divinity, friendship no longer remains. Whence, also, it is doubted, whether friends would wish for their friends the greatest of goods, such, for instance, as for them to be gods; for in this case they would no longer be friends to them. Neither, therefore, would they be a good to them; for friends are a good to each other. Hence, if it is well said, that a friend wishes well to his friend for his sake, it is requisite that he should remain such as he is. But he wished the greatest good may befal him, still remaining a man. And perhaps he does not wish that every good may befal him; for every one especially wishes to obtain good himself.

The multitude, however, appear from ambition to be more desirous of being beloved than of loving. Hence, the multitude love flatterers. For a flatterer is a friend who is surpassed [by him whom he flatters,] or pretends to be so, and also professes to love in a greater degree than he is beloved. But to be beloved appears to be proximate to the being honoured, after which the multitude aspire. It seems, however, that they do not choose honour on its own account, but from accident. For the multitude are delighted when they are honoured by those in power, through the hope [of the benefits they may thence derive;] for they fancy they shall obtain from them that of which they are in want. They are delighted, therefore, with honour, as an indication that they shall be benefited. But those who aspire after honour from worthy and intelligent men, desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves. They rejoice, therefore, that they are worthy persons, believing in the judgment of those who say that they are worthy; but they are delighted to be beloved per se. Hence, it would seem that this is a better thing than to be honoured, and that friendship is a thing eligible of itself. Friendship, however, seems to consist more in loving than in

being. beloved; of which this is an indication, that mothers rejoice in loving [their children]. For some mothers give their children to be privately educated by others, and love them knowing them to be their own offspring, but are not anxious to be beloved in return if both cannot be effected, but it appears to them to be sufficient if they see their children doing well. And they love their offspring, though the offspring are unable to pay that attention to their mother which is fit, because they are ignorant of her. Since, therefore, friendship consists rather in loving than in being beloved, and we praise those who are lovers of friends, to love appears to be the virtue of friends. Hence, those in whom this exists according to desert, are stable friends, and the friendship of such as these is stable. But thus, also, those who are unequal may especially become friends; for thus they will be equalized. Equality, however, and similitude are friendship, and especially the similitude of those who resemble each other in virtue; for being of themselves stable, they are also stable towards each other, and neither require any thing depraved, nor are subservient to any thing of this kind, but, as I may say, they prohibit what is base. For it is the province of good men, neither to err themselves, nor permit their friends to be subservient to erroneous conduct. But depraved men have no stability ; for they do not remain similar to themselves; but are only friends for a short time, being delighted with the depravity of each other. Useful, however, and pleasing men, remain friends for a longer time ; for they continue friends as long as they impart to each other pleasure and advantage. But the friendship which subsists on account of utility, appears to be composed from contraries; such as the friendship of

the poor with the rich man, and of the unlearned with the learned man. For he who is in want of any thing, aspiring to the possession of it, recompenses with something else him from whom he obtains what he wants. Hither, also, may be referred the lover and the beloved, the beautiful and the deformed. Hence, lovers sometimes appear to be ridiculous when they think they ought to be beloved as much as they love. If, therefore, they are similarly amiable, perhaps it is fit they should thus think; but it is ridiculous if they possess nothing of this kind. Perhaps, also, neither does one contrary desire another essentially, but only from accident. But the appetite is directed to the medium; for this is good. Thus, for instance, it is good to a dry thing not to become moist, but to arrive at the medium [between dryness and moisture ;] and in a similar manner to a hot thing, and to other substances. These things, however, must be omitted; for they are more foreign than is proper.

It seems, however, as we said in the beginning, that both friendship and justice are conversant with and exist in the same things ; for in all society there appears to be a certain justice and friendship. Men, therefore, call their fellow-sailors, and fellow-soldiers friends, and in a similar manner those who associate with them in other employments. But such as is the extent of their associations, such also is the extent of their friendship ; for such likewise is the extent of justice. The proverb, too, rightly says, " that all things are common among friends ;" for friendship consists in communion. Among brothers, however, and associates, all things are common; but among others they are limited to certain bounds ; and to some indeed more so, but to others less ; for with respect to friendship, also, some are friendships in a greater and others in a less degree. Just things, also, differ ; for there is not the same justice between parents and children, as between brothers towards each other, nor as between associates and fellow-citizens. And the like takes place in other friendships. Injuries, therefore, are different towards each of these, and they receive an increase, by how much the more the persons injured are friends. Thus, for instance, it is a more dire

thing to defraud an associate of money than a fellow citizen ; and not to assist a brother than to refuse assistance to a stranger ; and to strike a father, than to strike any other person. But the just is naturally adapted to be increased at one and the same time with friendship, as subsisting in the same things, and being equally extended. All communions or societies, however, resemble the parts of the political or civil communion. For men journey together with a view to a certain advantage, and in order to procure something which pertains to human life. Political communion, also, appears to exist for the sake of advantage, to have been established with a view to this from the beginning, and to continue so. For the attention of legislators is directed to this, and they say that what is advantageous in common is just. Other communions, therefore, partially aspire after utility. Thus, sailors aspire after the utility pertaining to navigation, or to the acquisition of wealth, or something of the like kind ; but soldiers aspire after the utility pertaining to war, whether riches are the object of their desire, or victory, or the capture of cities. The like, also, takes place among tribes and the populace. Some communions, however, appear to have been formed on account of pleasure, such as the communion from the celebration of festivals, or from societies instituted to promote good fellowship ; for these subsist for the sake of sacrificing and association. But all these appear to be subject to political communion ; for political communion does not aspire after present advantage, but to that which pertains to the whole of life ; performing sacrifices, and for this purpose forming assemblies, bestowing honours on the gods, and affording a cessation from labour, in conjunction with pleasure. For ancient sacrifices and assemblies

appear to have been instituted after collecting the fruits of the earth, as first fruits. All communions, therefore, appear to be parts of the political communion. But such-like friendships follow such-like communions.

There are, however, three species of a polity, and as many deviations from them, which are, as it were, the corruptions of these polities. But the polities indeed are a kingdom, an aristocracy, and the third is derived from the distribution of honours through the medium of wealth, which as it seems may be appropriately called a timocracy. Most men, however, are accustomed to call it [simply] a polity. But of these, a kingdom is the best, and a timocracy is the worst. The deviation, also, from a kingdom, is indeed a tyranny ; for both are monarchies. They differ, however, very much from each other. For the tyrant, indeed, looks to his own advantage ; but the king to the advantage of those whom he governs. For he is not a king who is not sufficient to himself, and who does not surpass his subjects in every kind of good. But a man of this description is in want of nothing. Hence, his attention will not be directed

to what is advantageous to himself, but to the benefit of those whom he governs ; for he who is not a person of this description, will be a certain elected king. A tyranny, however, is the contrary to a king [properly so called ;] for he pursues his own good. And from this it is more evident that he is the worst of rulers ; for that which is contrary to the best, is the worst. But the transition from a kingdom is into a tyranny ; for a tyranny is. the depravity of a monarchy. And a depraved king becomes a tyrant. The transition from an aristocracy is into an oligarchy, through the vice of the governors, who distribute civil offices in a manner contrary to desert, bestow upon themselves all, or the greater part of every thing that is good, and always appoint the same persons magistrates, paying more attention to wealth than to any thing else. Those, therefore, that govern are few, and are depraved instead of being the most worthy men. But the transition from a timocracy is into a democracy ; since these polities border on each other. . For in a timocracy, also, the multitude have dominion, and all those that are rich are equal. A democracy, however, is in the smallest degree depraved ; for it deviates but little from the form of a polity, [i. e. from a timocracy]. After this manner, therefore, polities are especially changed ; for thus they are changed the least, and the most easily. The resemblance, however, and as it were paradigms of them may be derived from families. For the communion, or society, between a father and his children has the form of a kingdom ; for a father pays attention to his children [for their own sakes]. Hence, also. Homer calls Jupiter father ; for the intention of a kingdom is to be a paternal government. . But among the Persians the government of a father is tyrannical ;

for they treat their children as slaves. The government, likewise, of a master towards his servants is tyrannical; for in this government that alone which is advantageous to the master is performed. This, therefore, appears to be right ; but the Persian government is erroneous. For of things that are different, the governments also are different. But the government of man and wife appears to be aristocratic. For the man governs according to desert, and in those things in which it is proper for the man to govern ; but he permits his wife to rule over such things as are adapted to be governed by a woman. If the man, however, has dominion in all things, the government is changed into an oligarchy ; for he does this contrary to desert, and not so far as he is the better character. But it sometimes happens that women, in consequence of being heiresses, govern [even in things pertaining to men]. The government, therefore, in this case, is not according to virtue, but is through wealth and power, in the same manner as in oligarchies. And the government of brothers resembles a democracy ; for they are equal, except so far as they differ in their ages. Hence, if there is a great difference in their ages, the friendship is no longer fraternal. But a democratic government is especially to be seen in those families which are without a master : for here all govern equally. In those families, also, where he who governs is a man of a weak understanding, every one has the power of acting as he pleases.

In each of the polities, however, friendship appears to have the same extent as justice. And the friendship, indeed, between a king and his subject consists in transcendency of beneficence ; for he benefits his subjects, since, being a good man, he attends to their interest like a shepherd, in order that they may do well. Whence, also, Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people. Such, likewise, is paternal friendship; but it differs in the magnitude of the benefits which it confers; For the father is the cause of the existence of his children, which appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence, and also procures him nutriment and education. The same things, likewise, are attributed to progenitors. So a father is naturally adapted to rule over his children, and progenitors over the offspring of their children, and kings over their subjects. But these friendships consist in transcendency ; on which account, also, parents are honoured. The just, therefore, in these is not the same, but subsists according to desert; for thus, also, the friendship subsists. There is likewise, the same friendship between a husband and wife, as in an aristocracy ; for it subsists according to virtue, and a more ample good is attributed to the better character, and that which is

adapted and appropriate is attributed to each. For thus, also, justice is effected. But the friendship of brothers resembles that of associates ; for they are equal, and of the same age; and persons of this description, apply themselves for the most part to the same disciplines, and are similar in their manners. The friendship, therefore, which exists in a timocracy resembles this ; for in this government it is requisite that the citizens should be equal and worthy persons. Hence, they alternately and equally govern. Such, therefore, is the friendship of brothers. In corrupt polities, however, as the justice is but small, so likewise is the friendship, and it exists in the smallest degree in the worst polity. For in a tyranny there is either no friendship, or very little ; since among those with whom there is nothing common between the governor and the governed, there is not any friendship ; for neither is there any justice. But the friendship between them, resembles that which is between an artist and his instrument, between the soul and the body, and between a master and his servant ; for these indeed are benefited by those that use them. There is not, however, any friendship with, nor justice towards things inanimate, as neither is there towards a horse or an ox, or towards a slave so far as he is a slave, since there is nothing common between these. For a slave is an animated instrument ; but an instrument is an inanimate slave. So far, therefore, as he is a slave, there is no friendship between him and his master; but there may be so far as he is a man. For it appears that there is a certain justice due from every man towards every man who is able to partake of law and compact ; and therefore there may also be a friendship between any one man and another, so far as each is a man. In tyrannical

governments, however, there is but little friendship and justice ; but there is very much of each in democracies ; for among those that are equal, many things are common.

All friendship, therefore, as we have before observed, consists in communion ; but it may be divided into that which subsists between kindred, and that which subsists between associates. But political friendships, the friendships of those of the same tribe, of those who sail together, and such like, are more similar to the friendships of associates ; for they appear to exist as it were from compact. Among these, also, hospitable friendship may be ranked. The friendship, likewise, of kindred appears to be multiform, and the whole of it depends from paternal friendship. For parents love their children, as being something of themselves ; but children love their parents, as being something proceeding from them. Parents, however, have a greater knowledge of their offspring, [so as to know more accurately that they are their offspring,] than the offspring know that they proceeded from their parents ; and that from which a thing is generated has a greater familiarity and alliance with the thing produced,

than the thing produced has with its maker. For that which originates from a thing, is the property of that from which it originates ; as a tooth, or a hair, or any thing else, is the property of its possessor; but that from which a thing originates, is not the property of any one of the things which originate from it, or is so in a less degree. The love also of parents to their children is superior to that of children to their parents, by length of time ; for parents love their children as soon as they are born ; but children their parents in process of time, when they begin to understand or perceive that they are their parents. From these things, likewise, it is evident on what account mothers love their children more [than fathers love them]. Parents, indeed, therefore, love their children as themselves ; for those that proceed from them are as it were their other selves, by being separated from them ; but children love their parents, as proceeding from them. Brothers, however, love each other in consequence of being born from the same parents; for sameness with their parents causes them to be the same with each other. Hence it is said, that they have the same blood, the same root, and such like expressions. They are, therefore, in a certain respect, one and the same in separate bodies. The being educated together also, and equality of age, greatly contribute to friendship ; for [according to the proverb]

" Equal delights in equal age."

* When cause and effect are of such a nature, that the latter derives its existence from the former, then the effect is the property of the cause ; since previously to proceeding from, it was contained in it. But the cause is not, properly speaking, the property of the effect ; for the effect only participates of the cause, but does not contain the whole of it in itself.

And those who are accustomed to the same things are associates. Hence, also, fraternal friendship is assimilated to the friendship of associates. Cousins, likewise, and the remaining kindred become conjoined from the friendship of brothers, in consequence of [immediately] originating from the same persons. Some, however, become more united in friendship, and others less, in consequence of the source of their race being nearer, or more remote. But the friendship of children towards their parents, and of men towards the gods, is as towards that which is good and transcendent. For parents and the gods confer the greatest benefits ; for they are the causes of existence and of being nourished, and when they are of a proper age, of being educated. A friendship also, of this kind, possesses the delectable and the useful in a greater degree than the friendship of strangers, because their life is in a greater degree more common. Those things however, are to be found in this friendship which exist in the friendship of associates; and in a greater degree in those that are worthy, and in short, in those that are similar, in proportion as they are more familiar, and love each other from their birth ; and in proportion as those who are born from the same parents, who are nourished together, and similarly educated, are more similar in their manners. In this friendship, likewise, the proof which is obtained from time, is most abundant, and most firm. And things pertaining to friendship subsist analogously in the remaining gradations of kindred. But the friendship between man and wife appears to be according to nature; for man is more a connubial than a political animal; and this by how much more a family is prior to, and more necessary than a city, and the procreation of offspring is more common

to other animals. In other animals, therefore, the communion proceeds thus far, [i. e. as far as to the procreation of offspring;] but men and women not only cohabit for the sake of begetting children, but also with a view to the necessaries and conveniences of life. For their employments are immediately divided, and those of the husband are different from those of the wife. Hence, they assist each other, referring their own private possessions to the common [good of the family]. On account of these things, therefore, both the useful and the delectable appear to be contained in this friendship. It will also exist on account of virtue, if the husband and wife are worthy characters. For there is a virtue pertaining to each, and they will rejoice in a thing of this kind. Children, however, appear to be a bond; and hence those marriages that are without children are more swiftly dissolved. For children are a common good to both the husband and wife; and that which is common connects. To inquire also how a husband ought to live with his wife, and in short, one friend with another, appears to be nothing else than to inquire how justice subsists between them. For it does not appear that there is the same justice between one friend and another, nor between one stranger, one associate, and one disciple, with another.

Since, therefore, there are three kinds of friendship, as was observed in the beginning, and according to each some are friends in equality, but others according to transcendency; for similarly good men are friends, and [between worthy men who are not equally worthy] the more may be the friend of the less worthy, and in a similar manner with respect to friendships which subsist on account of delight, and on account of utility, they may be equal or unequal, and different in the advantages with which they are attended;—this being the case, it is requisite that those friends who are equal should be equalized in loving and other things, [pertaining to friendship,] but that those who are unequal, should render to themselves that which is analogous in transcendencies. Accusations, however, and complaints reasonably take place in that friendship alone, or principally, which is founded in utility. For those who are friends on account of virtue, are readily disposed to benefit each other; for this is the peculiarity of virtue and friendship. But with those who contend with each other in kindness, there are no accusations nor contests;

' Viz. By how much more one friend is better than another, by so much the more he ought to be beloved.

for no one is indignant. with him who loves and benefits him; but if he is grateful, he will recompense him by benefiting him in return. He, however, who transcends [in the benefits which he confers,] obtaining that which he desires, will not accuse his friend; for each aspires after good. Nor do accusations and complaints very much take place in. the friendships which are founded in pleasure; for at one and the same time both obtain the object of their desire, if they rejoice to live together. He, however, will appear to be ridiculous who accuses him by whom he is not delighted, when it is not possible to spend his time with him. But the friendship which is founded in utility, is full of . accusations and complaints; for since they make use of each other with a view to advantage, they are always in want of more, and fancy they have less than is proper, and blame their friends because they do not obtain as much as they are in want of, though they deserve to obtain it. But those who benefit are not able to supply as much as those who are benefited require. It appears, however, that as the just is twofold, for one kind is unwritten, but the other is legal, thus also with respect to the friendship which is founded in utility, one kind indeed is ethical, but the other is legal. Accusations, therefore, then especially take place, when compacts are formed and dissolved, not with a view to the same friendship [as that by which they are united]. But the legal friendship founded in utility, is that which subsists by compacts; one kind, indeed, being entirely venal, from hand to hand, [viz. such as takes place in buying and selling;] but another kind is more liberal, in which one thing is to be given for another at a stated time, but from compact. In this friendship, however, that which is owing is manifest, and is not ambiguous, but a friendly Arist. VOL. II. U

delay is permitted to take place. Hence, with some of these, there are no judicial processes, but they think it is requisite to loose those who form compacts, from the obligation of fidelity. But the ethical friendship does not consist in compacts, but what it gives, it gives as to a friend, and this is also the case with whatever is imparted by the one to the other. He, however, who gives thinks it fit that he should receive in return an equivalent, or more than an equivalent, as if he had not given but lent; but if he does not receive the retribution which he expected from the contract, he accuses his friend. And this happens because all or most men wish to obtain things which are truly beautiful, but deliberately choose what is advantageous. But it is beautiful to benefit, not with a view to be benefited in return; and it is advantageous to be benefited. He, therefore, who is able, ought to make a retribution equivalent to the benefit he has received, and willingly; for a friend must not return kindness unwillingly. If, therefore, he has erred from the first, and has been benefited by an improper person; for he was not benefited by a friend, nor by one who did this for his sake;—if this be the case, retribution must be made, as if he had been benefited by compact. Hence, he who has been benefited by such a one, ought to promise that he will make a retribution if he can; but if he cannot, he who conferred the benefit ought not to think it fit that he should be recompensed, so that if possible, retribution is to be made. In the beginning, however, it is requisite, when a benefit is conferred, to consider by whom it is conferred, and with what view, so as either to accept or refuse it. But it may be doubted, whether retribution is to be measured by the advantage of him who receives it, or by the beneficence of him who made it. For those

who receive it say in extenuation that they receive such things from benefactors as are of little use to them, and which they might have received from others; but, on the contrary, the benefactors say that they bestow the greatest things which it was in their power to give, and which could not be obtained from others, and that they conferred them in dangerous circumstances, or such-like necessities. Since, therefore, this friendship subsists on account of utility, the measure of it is the advantage of him who is benefited. For he is the person who is in want, and his friend assists him, in order that he may receive an equal benefit in return. The assistance, therefore, afforded by him who is benefited, will be as great as that which he received. And as much or even more must be given by him in return ; for it is more beautiful and becoming. But in those friendships which are founded in virtue, there are no accusations; and the deliberate choice of him who benefits resembles a measure. For the authority of virtue and manners consists in deliberate choice.

Dissensions, however, take place in those friendships which subsist according to transcendency ; for each thinks it fit that he should have more than the other. But when this takes place, the friendship is dissolved. For the better character of the two thinks it is proper that he should have more than the other ; for more ought to be distributed to a good man. This is also the case with him who is the more useful person of the two ; for they say it is not fit that he who is useless should have an equal portion with him who is useful ; since ministrant offices will take place, and not friendship, unless what is done from friendship is according to the desert of the deeds. For they are of opinion, that as in pecuniary negociations, those who employ a greater sum of money receive more profit, thus also it ought to be in friendship. The contrary, however, is the opinion of him who is indigent, and who is the worse character ; for these think that it is the province of a good friend to assist those that are in want. For what advantage, say they, is there in being the friend of a worthy or powerful man, if no benefit is to be derived from him ? It seems, however, that each thinks rightly, and that it is requisite to distribute more to each from friendship, yet not of the same thing, but more of

honour indeed to him who transcends, but more of gain to him who is indigent ; for honour indeed is the reward of virtue and beneficence, but gain is the auxiliary of indigence. This also appears to be the case in polities. For he is not honoured who is the cause of no good to the community ; since that which is common is given to him who benefits the community ; but honour is something common. For it is not possible for a man at one and the same time to be enriched and honoured by the community ; since no one endures to have less in all things. Hence to him who is inferior in wealth honour is given ; but money to him who is to be bribed by gifts. For distribution according to desert equalizes and preserves friendship, as we have before observed. In this manner, therefore, it is requisite to act towards those who are unequal ; and he who is benefited either in wealth, or in virtue, should remunerate him by whom he is benefitted with honour, thus recompensing him as far as he is able. For friendship requires that which is possible, and not that which is according to desert. For a recompense according to desert is not possible in all things, as in honours conferred on the gods and parents ; since no one can bestow these according to desert ; but he who pays homage to them to the utmost of his power appears to be a worthy man. Hence, though it would seem not to be lawful for a son to abandon his father, yet it is lawful for a father to abandon his son. For a return ought to be made by him who is a debtor. But a son can do nothing worthy of the benefits he has received from his father ; so that he will always be his debtor. Those, however, to whom others are indebted have the power of abandoning their debtors ; and, therefore, a father has this power. At the same time, however, no

father perhaps will abandon his son, unless the son is transcendently depraved ; for, exclusive of natural friendship, it is human not to refuse giving assistance when it is wanted. But if the son is depraved, he is either to be amended by his father, or his father must not be anxious to assist him. [A depraved son, however, sometimes hates his father, or at least does not very much endeavour to assist him.] For the multitude wish to be benefited; but they avoid acting beneficently, as a useless thing. And thus much concerning these particulars.

' This sentence within the brackets, I have added from Mr. Bridgman's translation of the Paraphrase on the Nicomachean Ethics, by an anonymous Greek writer, as what follows it in the text seems to require it, as is well observed by Wilkinson.