Book IX

In all friendships, however, which are of a dissimilar species, the analogous, as we have already observed, equalizes and preserves friendship. Thus, for instance, in the political friendship, to the shoemaker a retribution is made for his shoes, according to their worth, and to the weaver, and other artificers. Here, therefore, a common measure, money, is employed ; and to this every thing is referred, and by this is measured. But in the amatory friendship, sometimes indeed the lover accuses the object of his love, that though he loves her beyond measure, he is not beloved in return, though, if it should

so happen, he has nothing which can excite love. Frequently, however, she who is beloved complains that her lover, having formerly promised every thing, now performs nothing [that he had promised]. But things of this kind happen, when the one indeed loves the object of his love on account of pleasure, but the other loves her lover on account of utility ; and these things are not present with both. For since the friendship exists on account of these things, a dissolution of it takes place, when those things are not accomplished which are the final causes of their love. For they do not love each other, but what each possesses, which is not stable. Hence, such also are their friendships, [viz. they are not stable]. The friendship, however, which is founded in manners [i. e. virtuous friendship] since it exists per se, [or independent of external circumstances] is permanent, as we have before observed. But friends also disagree when other things happen to them, and not those which were the objects of their desire ; for when a man does not obtain that which he desired, it is just as if he obtained nothing. Thus, a certain person promised a harper that he would reward him in proportion to the excellence of his singing. But in the morning, when the harper demanded the fulfilment of his promise, he said that he had returned pleasure for pleasure.' If, therefore, this [i. e. pleasure] had been the wish of each, the harper would have been sufficiently recompensed ; but if the object of the one was delight, and of the other gain, and if the object of the one was accomplished, but not of the other, the compact between them was not well fulfilled.

' Plutarch attributes this deed to Dionysius the Syracusan tyrant.

For a man will attend to those things of which he is in want, and for the sake of them will give what is requisite. With respect, however, to the recompense which ought to be made, whether ought it to be estimated by him who gives, or by him who receives ? For he who gives first, seems to leave to the receiver what the recompense should be; which they say Protagoras' also did. For when he had taught any thing, he ordered the learner to estimate what appeared to him to be the worth of the knowledge he had gained, and he received according to his valuation. But in things of this kind, to some persons it is sufficient to say.

Sufficient be the price a friend appoints.'

Those, however, who having first received money, afterwards perform nothing which they had promised to do, on account of the excessive magnitude of their promise, are deservedly accused ; for they do not perform what they had agreed to accomplish. But the sophists perhaps are compelled to do this, because no one would give money for those things which they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform that for which they received a reward, are justly blamed. With those persons, however, among whom there is no compact for services performed, we have already observed that those who first give to others on their own account, are not to be blamed; for of this kind is the friendship which is founded in virtue. Retribution, also, must be made according to deliberate choice ; for this is the province of

See my translation of the Protagoras of Plato. * This verse is. from. the Works and Days of Hesiod; but the half of it only is quoted by Aristotle.

of friendship and of virtue. This conduct, likewise, as it seems, should be adopted by those who are associates in philosophy; for the worth of philosophy is not to be measured by money, nor can any honour be conferred equivalent to its dignity. But perhaps it is sufficient that a recompense as great as possible is made, in the same manner as towards the gods and parents. Where, however, the gift is not such as this, but is conferred with a view to a certain thing, [i. e. with a view to some recompense,] a remuneration perhaps ought especially to be made, which to both friends will appear to be according to desert. But if this should not happen to take place, it may not only appear to be necessary, but also to be just, that he who first received, should determine what is an equal compensation. For if as much advantage or pleasure is returned as was received, the remuneration will be according to desert. For this also appears to take place in traffic; and in some places there are laws which forbid any judicial processes respecting voluntary contracts; as if it were fit that in communions of this kind there should be no other judge, nor any other law, but that all differences should be decided by the person in whom trust is reposed, and by whom such contracts are used. For they think that he who was intrusted to estimate the retribution, will judge more justly than he who reposed that trust; since, for the most part, those who possess, and those who wish to receive any thing, do not estimate equitably. For every one thinks that his own property and what he gives are of great value. At the same time, however, the retribution should be as great as it is determined to be by those who receive the gift. Perhaps, however, a thing is not to be estimated to be worth so much as it appeared to its possessor, but to be

worth as much as he would have estimated it to be before he possessed it.

SUCH particulars, however, as the following are dubious, viz. whether all things are to be assigned to a father, and he is to be obeyed in all things. Or whether the sick man ought indeed to obey the physician ; and he who votes for the general of an army, ought to give the preference to a man skilled in warlike concerns. And in a similar manner, whether it is proper to be subservient to a friend rather than to a worthy man. And whether remuneration is rather to be made to a benefactor than to an associate, if it is impossible to make it to both. It is not therefore easy to determine all such particulars accurately; for they have many and all-various differences, in magnitude and parvitude, in the beautiful and the necessary. But it is not immanifest that not all things are to be given to the same person ; and that for the most part benefits are rather to be returned to those from whom they were received, than gifts are to be bestowed on associates : just as it is more proper to return a loan to him from whom it was borrowed, than to make a present to an associate. Perhaps,

however, this must not always be done. For if any one should be made a prisoner by robbers, it may be inquired whether he who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn, be he who he may : or, whether the price of redemption should be given to him who demands it as his due, though he has not been taken prisoner ; or whether, in preference to all these, a father ought to be redeemed. For it would seem that a man should rather ransom his father than himself. Universally, therefore, as we have said, a debt ought to be paid; but if the donation surpasses in the beautiful or the necessary, we should incline to it, [rather than to the discharge of a debt.] For sometimes it is not equitable to return a benefit which another person has first conferred, when he indeed conferred the benefit knowing that it was bestowed on a worthy man, but the retribution will be made to one whom he who is to make it believes to be a depraved man. For neither sometimes is a loan to be granted to him who has lent. For the one indeed, [i. e. the depraved man] thinking that he shall receive back what he has lent, grants a loan to the worthy man; but the other [i. e. the worthy man,] does not expect that what he has lent will be returned by the depraved man. Whether, therefore, the thing thus exists in reality, the merit of the parties is not equal, or whether it does not thus exist, but it is fancied that it does, they will not appear to act absurdly. Therefore, as it has frequently been observed, assertions concerning passions and actions are similarly definite and certain with the things about which they are conversant. It is not, therefore, immanifest, that the same things are not to be bestowed on all men, nor all things on a father, as neither are all things to be sacrificed to Jupiter. Since, however, different things are

to be returned to parents, brothers, associates, and benefactors, a retribution is to be made to each of such things as are proper and appropriate. And thus indeed men appear to act. For they invite their kindred to weddings ; since the genus of these is common, and, therefore, the actions also which are conversant with this are common. For the same reason, likewise, they think it especially necessary that kindred should be present at funerals. But it would seem that it is especially necessary to supply our parents with nutriment, because we are their debtors; and it is more beautiful to supply with these things the causes of our existence than ourselves. Honour also is to be paid to parents as to the gods ; yet not every honour is to be paid to them. For neither is the same honour to be paid to a father and mother ; nor again, to a wise man, or the general of an army ; but to a father paternal, and to a mother maternal honour is to be paid. To every elderly man, likewise, honour is to be paid according to his age, by rising from our seat, and resigning it to him, and by other things of the like kind. To associates again, and brothers, freedom of speech must be granted, and a participation in common of all things. To kindred, also, to those of the same tribe, to fellow-citizens, and to all the rest of mankind, we should endeavour to distribute what is appropriate, and judiciously determine what pertains to each according to familiarity and virtue, or use. A judgment, therefore, may more easily be made respecting those who are of the same genus ; but in those of a different genus, the decision is more difficult. We must not, however, on this account desist, but determine as far as circumstances will permit.

The dissolution also of friendships is attended with a doubt, viz. whether friendship is to be dissolved with those who do not continue to be our friends. Or shall we say that with those who are friends on account of advantage and delight, when they no longer possess these, it is by no means absurd that the friendship should be dissolved? For they were the friends of these things [viz. of things advantageous and delectable,] and these failing, it is reasonable to suppose that they will no longer be attached to each other. He, however, may be [justly] accused, who loving another person on account of advantage or delight, pretends that he loves on account of manners, [i. e. virtuously]. For as we said in the beginning, numerous dissensions take place among friends, when they are not in reality such friends as they fancy they are. When, therefore, any one is deceived, and apprehends that he is beloved on account of his manners, though at the same time he does nothing that is virtuous, he should blame himself. But when he is deceived by the pretensions of the other, it is just to accuse the deceiver, and more so than those who adulterate money, because the improbity pertains to a more honourable thing. If, however, he admitted him into his friendship

as a good man, but he becomes a bad man, or should appear to have become a bad man, is he still to be beloved? Or is this not possible? Since not every thing deserves to be beloved, but that only which is good. Neither, therefore, is a bad man to be beloved, nor is it necessary that he should. For it is not fit to be a lover of what is depraved, nor to be assimilated to a bad man. And we have already observed that the similar is a friend to the similar. Is the friendship, therefore, to be immediately dissolved ? Or shall we say, not with all persons, but with those who are incurable on account of their depravity ? For assistance ought rather to be given to the manners of those who are capable of being corrected, than to their worldly possessions, because this is better, and more adapted to friendship. He, however, who dissolves such a friendship will appear not to act at all absurdly ; for he was not a friend to this man, or to a man of this description. Hence, as he cannot restore him, being thus changed, to virtue, he abandons him. But if the one indeed continues [such as he was at first,] and the other should become more worthy, so as very much to transcend in virtue, is the latter still to use the former as a friend ? Or is this not possible ? This, however, becomes especially evident in a great interval, as in the friendships formed from childhood. For if one of these should still remain a child in understanding, but the other should be a most excellent man, how can they be friends, when they are neither addicted to the same pursuits, nor delighted and pained with the same things? For neither will these be present with them, towards each other. But without these they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. Concerning these particulars, however, we have already spoken. Shall we say, there-

fore, [that when the friendship is dissolved,] the one ought nevertheless so to conduct himself towards the other as if he had never been his friend? Or is it necessary that he should still retain the memory of their past friendship ? And as we think it is proper to gratify friends rather than strangers, thus also shall we say, something must be conceded to former friends, on account of pristine friendship, when the dissolution of it was not occasioned by an excess of depravity ?

With respect, however, to friendly offices, and those things by which friendships are defined, they seem to proceed from the conduct of a man towards himself. For he is defined to be a friend who wishes well to another, and performs things which are really or apparently good for his sake ; or who wishes his friend to exist and live for his sake ; just as mothers are affected towards their children, or friends who [for a time,] are offended with each other. Others, however, define a friend to be one who lives with another person, and who chooses the same things, or mutually grieves and rejoices with him. But this also especially happens to mothers. By some one

of these particulars, likewise, they define friendship. Each of these, however, exists in the worthy man towards himself ; but they exist in other men, so far as they apprehend themselves to be worthy. For it seems, as we have before observed, that virtue and a worthy man are a measure to every one ; since a worthy man accords with himself, and aspires after the same things with his whole soul, [i. e. with both the rational and irrational part.] Hence, he wishes for himself both real and apparent good, and acts conformably to his wishes. For it is the province of a worthy man to labour in what is good, and this for his own sake ; since he labours for the sake of his dianoetic part, which each of us appears to be, [i. e. in which our very essence consists]. He also wishes that he himself may live and be preserved, and especially this part, by which he is wise ; for to a worthy man existence is a good thing. Every one, however, wishes well to himself. But there is no one, who, if he should become a different person from what he is, would choose [having lost his identity,] that the person into whom he is changed should possess all things. For now also God possesses good, but he [always] remains such as he is, whatever that may be. It would seem, however, that each of us is that which energizes intellectually, or that each of us is principally this. Such a man also wishes

' Aristotle speaks thus reverentially of the ineffable principle of things, conformably to the practice of all the great philosophers and theologists of antiquity, who for the most part, as I have shown in my translation of Plato, passed over this immense principle in silence, as well knowing it is only to be apprehended by extending in silence the ineffable parturitions of the soul, to its ineffable coessation. Hence, it was venerated by the Egyptians, as a thrice unknown darkness.

to live with himself; since he does this willingly. For the remembrance of what he has done is delightful to him, and his hopes of what is future are good; but such things are delectable. He abounds likewise in his dianoetic part with contemplations; and he is especially pained and pleased in conjunction with himself. For the same thing is always painful and pleasing to him, and not a different thing at a different time; since, as I may say, he is without repentance, [i. e. he does nothing of which he has occasion to repent]. Since, therefore, each of

* What Aristotle here says concerning the worthy man living with himself, accords with what Plato, in the Timæus, asserts of the soul of the world. For among other prerogatives possessed by this soul, he says, " That the demiurgus, or its fabricating cause, established the world one single solitary nature, able through virtue to associate with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts he rendered the universe a happy god." On which passage, Proclus beautifully observes as follows; " In what is now said, Plato clearly shows what the solitude is which he ascribes to the world, and that he calls that being solitary which looks to itself, and its own apparatus, and to the proper measure of its nature. For those who live in solitude are the saviours of themselves, so far as pertains to human causes. The universe, therefore, is after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to, and possessing the power of preserving itself, not through any diminution, but through a transcendency of power. He also adds, that it is sufficient to itself through virtue. For among partial animals [such as men,] he alone who possesses virtue, is able to associate with, and love himself. But every bad man looking to his inward baseness, is indignant with himself, and his own essence, but is stupidly astonished by external things, and pursues an association with others, in consequence of not being able to look into himself. The worthy man, however, perceiving himself beautiful, rejoices and is delighted, and bringing forth in himself beautiful conceptions, embraces the converse with himself. For we naturally become familiar with the beautiful, but turn away from deformity.

these things is present with the worthy man towards himself, but he is disposed towards his friend in the same manner as towards himself; for a friend is another self; this being the case, the friendship also of these appears to be something, and those with whom these things are present appear to be friends. At present, however, we shall omit the consideration whether or not there can be friendship between a man and himself. But it would seem that there may be friendship between a man and himself, when the rational and irrational parts are no longer two things but one thing [through their union and consent]; and also because an excess of friendship resembles the regard which a man has for himself. The particulars likewise which we have mentioned are seen to take place among the multitude, though they are depraved characters. Shall we say, therefore, that so far as they are pleasing to themselves, and apprehend themselves to be worthy, so far they participate of these things? For these things are not inherent, nor do they even appear to be inherent in any one of those who are very depraved and wicked; and nearly indeed they are not inherent even in those who are merely depraved. For they are discordant with themselves; and, like the incontinent, they desire one thing, but wish another; for they choose delectable things which are noxious, instead of those things which appear to them to be good. Others, again, through timidity and indolence abstain from doing those things which they think are best for themselves. But those by whom many and dreadful deeds are performed, and who are hated on account of their

' I have here adopted the reading mentioned by Eustratius, as more conformable to the meaning of Aristotle.

desperately, fly from life, and destroy themselves. Depraved men, likewise, search for those with whom they may pass their time, but fly from themselves ; for they recollect when they are alone the many crimes they have committed, and expect the evils which are attendant on such wickedness will befal them ; but they forget these when they are with others. Possessing likewise nothing amiable, they are not affected in a friendly manner towards themselves. Persons, therefore, of this description, neither rejoice nor condole with themselves ; for their soul is in a state of sedition; and one part of it indeed is pained on account of depravity, when it abstains from certain things, but the other part is delighted. And the one part indeed draws this, but the other that way, the soul as it were being lacerated [by sense and reason]. If, however, it is not possible for him to be at one and the same time pained and pleased, yet after a short time he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that these delectable things had not befallen him; for bad men are full of repentance. The bad man, therefore, does not appear to be disposed in a friendly manner even towards himself, because he possesses nothing amiable. But if it is very miserable to be in this condition, every one should strenuously fly from depravity, and endeavour to be worthy ; for thus a man will be disposed in a friendly manner towards himself, and will become the friend of others.

BENEVOLENCE, however, resembles indeed friendship, yet is not friendship ; for benevolence may be exerted towards unknown persons, and latently ; but friendship cannot. These things, therefore, have been asserted before. But neither is it dilection ; for it has not either impulse or appetite ; and these are consequent to dilection. And dilection indeed subsists in conjunction with custom; but benevolence may be suddenly produced. Thus the spectators sometimes become suddenly benevolent towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities, and unite with them in their wishes for success ; but they do not at all co-operate with them. For, as we have said, they become suddenly benevolent towards them, and love them superficially. Benevolence, therefore, appears to be the beginning of friendship ; just as the pleasure received through the sight is the beginning of love ; for no one loves who has not been previously delighted with the form [of the beloved object.] He,

' This observation of Aristotle, that the beginning of love is through the sight, reminds me of a very beautiful passage in the romance of Achilles Tatius, entitled the Loves of Clitophon and Leucippe, and which I earnestly recommend to the attentive perusal of every one who is incontinent in amatory concerns. The passage

however, who is delighted with this form, does not love the more on that account, but his love is then more ardent, when he longs for the object of his love when absent, and desires her presence. Thus, also, it is impossible for men to be friends, unless they have been first benevolent. But those who are benevolent [only,] do not on this account love each other the more; for they only wish well to those to whom they are benevolent; but they do not co-operate with them in any thing.

is as follows: (lib. I.) Ουκ οισθα οτι τερπνοτερον θεαμα ερωμενης η απολαυσις;

Τουτο δε εστι μιξεως ακρατου και ασωματου· οι γαρ οφθαλμοι της ψυχην αλληλοις αντανακλωμενοι, αποματτουσιν ως εν κατοπτρω τα των σωματων ειδωλα· η δε απορροη του καλλους δι' αυτων εις την ψυχην ελκομενη εχει τινα μιξιν εν αποστασει σωματος· ολιγη δε εστιν η των σωματων μιξις· κενη γαρ εστι σωματων συμπλοκη· οφθαλμος γαρ φιλιας προξενος, i. e. "Do you not know that there is a greater pleasure in looking at, than in embracing the beloved object? For the eyes when looking at each other, express the images of bodies as in a mirrour. But the efflux of beauty, flowing through the eyes into the soul, has a certain mingling in an apostacy from body, [viz. the beauty proceeding from one body through the eyes, is mingled with the beauty proceeding from the other, separate from body]. And the pleasure arising from the mingling of bodies is small; since the connexion of bodies is inane. For the eye is the conciliator of love. "

The pleasure, therefore, arising from this mingling of forms through the eyes is greater than that which is produced by copulation, because the mingling in the former case is in a certain respect incorporeal, being the mixture of forms in the imagination. For the imagination neither alone consists of parts, nor is without parts. For if it was partible alone, it could not preserve in itself many impressions of forms, since the subsequent would obscure the pre-existent figures, for no body can contain at once, and according to the same situation, a multitude of figures, but the former will be obliterated by the succession of the latter. And if it was alone impartible, it would not be inferior to the rational power of the soul, which surveys all things impartibly.

nor do they endure any molestation for their sake. Hence it may be metaphorically said, that benevolence is sluggish friendship ; but by length of time and custom it may become friendship, yet not that friendship which is founded in utility, nor that which is founded in delight ; for benevolence does not subsist on account of these. things. For, he indeed, who is benefited, distributes benevolence in return for the favours he has received, in so doing acting justly. But he who wishes prosperity to the actions of any one, hoping that through him he shall be enriched, does not appear to be benevolent to him, but rather to himself; as neither is he a friend if he pays attention to him with a view to a certain advantage. In short, benevolence is produced through virtue, and a certain probity, when some one appears beautiful, or brave, or the like to another person; in the same manner as we said it was produced towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities.

Concord likewise appears to pertain to friendship ; on which account, it is not an agreement in opinion ; for this indeed may exist between those who are ignorant of each other. Nor are those said to be concordant who are unanimous about any things, as about the celestial bodies ; for it does not belong to friendship to be concordant about these things. But cities are said to be concordant, when they are unanimous about things which contribute to the general good, and when they deliberately choose the same things, and do what has been deemed in common fit to be done. Men are, therefore, concordant about practical affairs, and of these, about such as surpass others in magnitude, and which may befall two persons or all men. Thus cities are in concord when it appears to all the citizens that magistrates should be elected, or that a warlike compact should be formed with the Lacedaemonians, or that Pittacus should be the archon, because he also is willing to accept this office. But when each of the citizens wishes to be himself the archon, as was the case among the Phoenicians, then they are in a state of sedition. For concord does not consist in each person forming the same conception about a thing, whatever that thing may be, but when they agree in wishing

the same thing to the same person ; as when the people

and worthy men agree in wishing that the most excellent

men may govern ; for thus all the citizens obtain what

they desire. Concord, however, appears to be political

friendship, as also it is said to be ; for it is conversant

with what is advantageous, and with those things which

relate to the purposes of life. But a concord of this

kind exists among worthy men; for these are in concord

with themselves and with each other, since they are, as I

may say, conversant with the same things. For the

wishes of men of this description are permanent, and do

not undergo a flux and reflux, like the Euripus. For

their will is directed to things just and advantageous;

and these they desire in common. But bad men cannot

be concordant, except in a small degree; just as they

cannot likewise be friends ; since they desire in things

advantageous to have the greater part themselves, but in

labours and ministrant services they are deficient. Each,

however, wishing that these things may befal himself, he

explores how he may prevent others from obtaining that

which he desires. For concord perishes when justice,

which is a common good, is not preserved. It happens,

therefore, that they are in a state of sedition, compelling

indeed each other, but being themselves unwilling to do

Benefactors, however, appear to love in a greater degree those whom they benefit, than those who are benefited do their benefactors, and the cause of this is investigated as a thing not conformable to reason. To most men, therefore, the cause appears to be this, that these are debtors, and those the persons to whom they are indebted. Hence, as in loans, debtors wish their creditors not to be in existence, but creditors are concerned for the safety of their debtors ; thus, also, benefactors wish those whom they have benefited to exist, in order that they may obtain a recompense ; but those who are benefited, are not concerned about making a recompense. Epicharmus, therefore, perhaps would say, that these things are asserted by most men, in consequence of looking to the depravity of mankind ; but to act in this manner seems to be conformable to human nature. For the multitude are unmindful of the benefits they have received, and are more desirous to be benefited than to benefit. It would seem, however, that the cause of this is more natural, and does not resemble that which pertains to the loan of money ; for creditors do not love their debtors, but wish them to be preserved, for the sake of receiving what they have lent. But benefactors

love, and are fond of those they have benefited, though at present they derive no advantage from them, nor are likely to derive any in future. And this, also, happens to be the case with artificers ; for every artist loves his own work, more than he would be beloved by it, if it should become animated. Perhaps, however, this particularly happens to be the case with poets ; for they love their own poems beyond measure, and have an affection for them as if they were children. Similar therefore to this is that which pertains to benefactors, for he who is benefited is their work. Hence, this person is more dear to them than a work is to him by whom it is produced. The cause however of this is, that existence is to all beings eligible and lovely; but we exist in energy; for we exist by living and acting. He, therefore, who produces a work, is in a certain respect in energy [in the work]. Hence, he loves the work with a parental affection, because existence also is dear to him. But this is natural; for what the agent is in capacity, is indicated by the work in energy. At the same time, also, to the benefactor, that which results from the action is beautiful, so that he is delighted with him in whom it is inherent; but to him who is benefited nothing is beautiful in the benefactor, but if any thing is, it is utility; and this is in a less degree delightful and lovely. The energy, however, of present good is delectable, as is likewise the hope of future, and the memory of past good; but that good is most delectable, which subsists in energy, and in a similar manner that which is lovely. To him who benefits, therefore, the work remains; for a beautiful deed is lasting; but to him who is benefited, the advantage passes away. The memory, likewise, of beautiful deeds is delectable; but the memory of useful

actions, is not very delightful, or is so in a less degree. It appears, however, that the contrary takes place with respect to expectation. And dilection, indeed, resembles production; but to be beloved is similar to the being passive. To love, therefore, and such things as pertain to friendship, are consequent to those who excel, in action. Again, all men love in a greater degree things which are laboriously obtained. Thus, for instance, men love the wealth which they have themselves procured, more than that which they have received from others. It appears, therefore, that to be benefited is a thing unattended with labour; but that to benefit is laborious. On this account, also, mothers love their children in a greater degree than fathers; for the part which they sustain in the generation of them is more laborious than that which fathers sustain, and they in a greater degree know that they are their own offspring. But it would seem that this reasoning also is adapted to benefactors.

It may however be doubted, whether a man ought to love himself more than some other person. For those are reprehended who love themselves transcendently; and they are called, as a thing disgraceful, lovers of themselves. And a bad man, indeed, appears to do every thing for the sake of himself, and in a greater degree the more he is depraved. Hence, he is accused as doing nothing without a view to his own advantage. But the worthy man does every thing on account of the beautiful in conduct, and he acts in a greater degree in this manner, and for the sake of his friend, the more worthy he is ; but he neglects to act for his own sake. The deeds however of men are discordant with these assertions not unreasonably. For they say that he who is eminently a friend, ought to love his friend in an eminent degree ; but he is eminently a friend who wishes well to him who is the subject of this wish for his sake, though no one should know it. These things, however, are especially inherent in a man towards himself, and therefore every thing else by which a friend is defined. For we have before observed that all friendly offices proceed from himself, and pervade to others. And all proverbs

accord with this ; such as that [friends] are one soul; that among friends all things are common ; that friendship is equality ; and that the knee is near to the leg. For all these things are especially present with a man towards himself ; since a man is especially a friend to himself; and therefore he is especially to be beloved by himself.

It may, however, be reasonably doubted, which of these arguments it is requisite to follow, since both of them are accompanied with probability. Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary to divide such-like arguments, and to distinguish how far, and in what respect each of them is true. If, therefore, we understand in what manner each of these denominates a man a lover of himself, perhaps the thing will become manifest. Those, therefore, who consider this as a disgraceful thing, call those men lovers of themselves, who distribute to themselves the greater part, in wealth and honours, and corporeal pleasures. For the multitude aspire after these things, and are earnestly employed in endeavouring to acquire them, as being the best of things ; and on this account they become objects of contention. Hence, those, who vindicate to themselves more of these things than is fit, are subservient to desires, and in short to passions, and the irrational part of the soul. But the multitude are persons of this description. Hence, also, the appellation was derived from the multitude, who are depraved. Justly, therefore, are those reprehended, who are in this way lovers of themselves. That the multitude, however, are accustomed to denominate those who distribute to themselves things of this kind, lovers of themselves, is not immanifest. For he who always earnestly endea-

vours to act justly, or temperately, or to act according to any other of the virtues, the most of all things, and in short, who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct; — such a man will never be called by any one a lover of himself, nor will he be blamed by any one. It would seem, however, that such a man as this, is in a greater degree a lover of himself; for he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good, is gratified in his most principal part [intellect,] and in all things is obedient to it. But as that which is the most principal thing in a city, appears to be most eminently the city, and this is the case in every other system of things; thus, also, that which is most principal in man is especially the man. He, therefore, who loves this principal part of himself, is especially. a lover of himself, and is gratified with this. Hence, also, one man is denominated continent, and another incontinent, because in the former intellect has dominion, but has not in the latter, in consequence of every man being this, [i. e. intellect]. Men, likewise, appear to have performed things, and to have performed them willingly, which they have especially performed in conjunction with reason. That every man, therefore, is principally intellect, and that the worthy man principally loves this, is not immanifest. Hence, he will be especially a lover of himself, according to a different species of self-love from that which is disgraceful, and differing as much from it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion, and as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct, differs from the desire of that which appears to be advantageous. All men, therefore, approve of and applaud those who in a manner superior to others endeavour to perform beautiful actions. But

258 THE NICOMACHEAN BOOK IX.

if that which is really beautiful in conduct was that on which all men contended, and if they endeavoured to perform the most beautiful deeds, whatever is becoming would be possessed by all men in common, and the greatest of goods by every one particularly ; since virtue is a thing of this kind. Hence, it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of himself; for he himself is benefited by acting well, and he also benefits others. But it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself ; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, in consequence of being subservient to base passions. With the depraved man, therefore, there is a dissonance between what he ought to do, and what he does ; but with the worthy man, those things which he ought to do, he also does. For every intellect chooses that which is best for itself; and the worthy man is obedient to intellect. That, however, which is asserted of the worthy man is true, that for the sake of his friends and his country, he will do many things, even though it should be requisite to die for them ; for he will give up riches and honours, and in short those goods which are the objects of contention with mankind, in order that he may vindicate to himself that which is beautiful in conduct. For he will rather choose to be very much delighted for a short time, than to experience a small delight for a long time, and to live worthily for one year, than casually for many years. He will also prefer one beautiful and great action, to many and small actions. And this perhaps happened to be the case with those who have died [for their country, or their friends]. Worthy men, therefore, choose a great good for themselves ; and will give up their riches in order that they may obtain a greater number of friends. For thus, indeed, riches befal

the friend of the worthy man, but that which is really beautiful befalls the worthy man himself; but he distributes to himself the greater good. There is also the same mode of conduct with him as to honours and dominion ; for he will give up all these to his friend ; for this to him is beautiful and laudable. Reasonably, therefore, does he appear to be a worthy man, who chooses that which is beautiful in conduct instead of these things. It may likewise happen, that he may give up actions to his friend, and that it may be better for him to be the cause of their being performed by his friend, than to do them himself. Hence, in all laudable things, the worthy man appears to distribute to himself more of that which is truly beautiful. After this manner, therefore, as we have said, it is necessary that a man should be a lover of himself, but it is not proper he should be so in the way in which the multitude love themselves.

With respect to the happy man, also, it is doubted, whether he will be in want of friends or not. For it is said, that those who are blessed and sufficient to themselves have no need of friends; because things truly good are present with them. As they are, therefore, (say they) sufficient to themselves, they are not in want of any thing; but a friend being a man's other self, imparts to him those things which he cannot obtain through himself. Whence, also, it is said, " When divinity is propitious, what need is there of friends ?" It seems, however, to be absurd that those who attribute every good to the happy man, should not give him friends, which appear to be the greatest of external goods. But if it is the province of a friend rather to benefit than to be benefited, and if it is also the province of a good man and of virtue to benefit, and it is better to do good to friends than to strangers, the worthy man will want those who may be benefited by him. Hence, likewise, it is inquired, whether there is more need of friends in adversity than in prosperity; because he who is unfortunate is in want of those by whom he may be benefited, and the fortunate are in want of those whom they may benefit. Perhaps, however, it is also absurd to make the blessed man a solitary being; for no one would choose

to possess every good by himself; since man is a social animal, and is naturally adapted to live with others. This, therefore, will also be the case with the happy man; for he possesses those things which are naturally good. But it is evident, that it is better to pass the time with friends and worthy men, than with strangers and casual persons. Hence, the happy man has need of friends. In what respect, therefore, is the first assertion true [[that the happy man is not in want of friends?] Is it because the multitude think those persons to be friends who are useful to them? The blessed man, therefore, will not be in any want of such persons, since real good is present with him. Neither, therefore, will he be in want of those who are friends on account of the delectable, or he will want them but for a short time ; for since his life is delightful, he will be in no want of adventitious pleasure. But not being in want of friends of this description, he does not appear to be in want of friends.

This, however, perhaps is not true. For it was observed by us in the beginning, that felicity is a certain energy ; but with respect to energy, it is evident that it is in generation, or is passing into existence, and is not present with him who energises, like a certain possession. But if to be happy consists in living and energizing, and the energy of the good man is of itself worthy and delectable, as we observed in the beginning ; if also that which is appropriate ranks among the number of things that are delightful, but we are more able to survey our

• ytnrm. This word both with Aristotle and Plato signifies an extension of subsistence, and not mere existence, like the words το ειναι and το ζην

neighbours than ourselves, and their actions than our own ; and if the actions of worthy men that are friends are delightful to good men, (for both have these things which are naturally delectable) — if this be the case, the blessed man will be in want of such friends, if, therefore, since he deliberately chooses to survey worthy and appropriate actions. But the actions of a good man who is a friend are of this description. It is likewise thought to be necessary, that the happy man should live delectably. The life, therefore, of a solitary man is indeed difficult ; for it is not easy for a man to energize continually by himself, but with others, and towards others it is easy. The energy, therefore, will be more continued which is delectable by itself; which should necessarily be present with the blessed man. For the worthy man, so far as he is worthy, rejoices in the actions which are conformable to virtue, but is indignant with those which proceed from vice ; just as a musician is delighted with beautiful melodies, but is pained with those that are bad. A certain exercise of virtue likewise will be produced from living with good men, as also Theognis says. To those, however, who consider this affair more physically, it appears that a worthy friend is naturally eligible to a worthy man; for it has been said by us, that what is naturally good, is of itself to a worthy man good and delectable. To live, however, is in animals defined by the power of sense, but in men by the power of sense or intellect. But power is referred to energy; and that which has the principal authority in a thing consists in energy. It seems, therefore, that to live is properly either to perceive sensibly, or intellectually; and to live is among the number of things which are good and delectable; for it is a definite thing. But that which is definite pertains to the

nature of the good, [as it also appeared to the Pythagoreans;] and that which is naturally good, is also good to the worthy man. Hence to live appears to all men to be delightful. A depraved and corrupted life, however, ought not to be assumed, nor a life of pain; for such a life is indefinite, as well as the things which belong to it. This, however, will be more evident in what we shall say concerning pain hereafter. But if to live is itself good, it is also delectable. And it appears that it is so from this, that all men aspire after it, and especially worthy and blessed men; for to these life is most eligible, and the life of these is most blessed. He, however, who sees, perceives that he sees, he who hears, perceives that he hears, and he who walks, perceives that he walks; and in a similar manner in other things there is something which perceives that we energize. But we may perceive that we perceive, and we may understand that we understand. For us, however, to perceive that we perceive or to understand that we understand, is for us to be; for we have said that our very being consists in perceiving sensibly or intellectually. But for a man to perceive that he lives, is among the number of things essentially delectable; for life is naturally good. And for a man to perceive that good is present with him is delightful. But to live is eligible, and especially to good men, because existence to them is good and delectable; for, having a co-sensation of essential good, they are delighted. As, however, the worthy man is disposed towards himself, thus also he is disposed towards his friend; for a friend is another self. As, therefore, it is eligible to every one for himself to exist, thus also or similarly it is eligible to him for his friend to exist. But we have said, that existence is eligible, because it is for a man to perceive

himself, which is good; and a sensation of this kind is of itself delightful. It is necessary, therefore, that he should at the same time perceive that his friend exists; but this will be effected by living together with him, and in a communication with him of words and thoughts, for it would seem that in this way men are said to live together, and not as cattle, by feeding in the same place. If, therefore, existence is of itself eligible to the blessed man, since it is naturally good and delectable, the same also must be asserted of a friend; and hence a friend will be among the number of eligible things to the happy man. But that which is eligible to him, ought to be present with him; or in this respect he will be indigent. The man, therefore, who is to be happy will require worthy friends.

Are numerous friends, therefore, to be procured? or, as it appears to be elegantly said of hospitality,

Want not, nor be of multitudes a guest;

may it also in friendship be appropriately said, that a man should neither be without a friend, nor again should have

a multitude of friends? This assertion, therefore, This will indeed appear to be very much adapted to those who regard utility in friendship; for to be alternately subservient to many persons is laborious, and life is not sufficient to them to perform this. Hence, more friends than are sufficient for the proper purposes of life are superfluous, and are impediments to a worthy life. There is, therefore, no need of them. And with respect to the friends that are procured for the sake of pleasure, a very few are sufficient; in the same manner as sauce to food. But whether or not ought a good man to have many worthy friends? Or shall we say that there is a certain measure of a multitude of friends, in the same manner as there is of a city? For a city will not consist of ten men, nor is it any longer a city if it is composed of a hundred thousand men. Perhaps, however, one certain number of citizens cannot be assigned, but every number may be admitted which is between certain definite terms. Of friends, therefore, there is also a certain definite multitude; and perhaps those persons are not numerous with whom it is possible for a man to live, for this appears to be a thing of a most friendly nature.

For in a city consisting of a hundred thousand persons, the citizens cannot be known to each other, and therefore it will not be so much a city as a region. Besides in a city properly so called, there must be orderly and good government: but it is impossible in a community of a hundred thousand men, for the governors to know the way in which every man lives, though this is essentially necessary to good government. Hence, in London, which is said to consist of a million of inhabitants, it is well known that twenty or thirty thousand persons rise every morning, without knowing how they shall subsist through the day.

In the original, wXuwrt; but it should evidently be ev wMtrm

But that it is not possible for a man to live with many, and distribute himself among them, is not immanifest. Further still, it is necessary [if the friends are numerous] that they should be friends to each other, if all of them intend to pass the time with each other; but this among many friends is laborious. It is likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve appropriately together with many persons; for it is probable that it may at one and the same time happen, that a man ought to rejoice together with one person, and grieve together with another. Perhaps, therefore, it is well not to endeavour to have a great number of friends, but as many as are sufficient for the purposes of social life ; for it would seem that it is not possible to be very much a friend to many persons. Hence, neither is it possible to love many ; for love is a certain excess of friendship. But this is confined to one person ; and, therefore, vehement love must be confined to a few. That this, indeed, is the case, seems to be verified by themselves. For there are not many friends according to that friendship which subsists among associates; but the friendships which are celebrated, are said to have subsisted between two persons. Those, however, who are the friends of many persons, and are familiarly conversant with all of them, appear to be the friends of no one, except politically, and these persons are also called obsequious. It is possible, therefore, to be politically a friend to many persons, though he who is so should happen not to be obsequious, but a truly worthy man ; but it is not possible to be a friend to many, on account of virtue, and for their own sake. But we must be satisfied if we can find a few such, [i. e. who are true friends].

But whether is there more need of friends in prosperity, or in adversity ? For in both they are sought after. For those who are in adversity require assistance, and those who are in prosperity are in want of associates, and those whom they may benefit; since they wish to confer favours on others. In adversity, therefore, friends are more necessary ; on which account, when this is the case, there is need of useful friends. In prosperity, however, friends are a more worthy and beautiful possession ; on which account, also, men whose circumstances are prosperous, search for worthy friends ; for it is more eligible to benefit these, and with these to pass through life. For the presence itself of friends is delightful both in prosperity and adversity ; since the grief of those who are in affliction is lightened when their friends participate of their sorrow. Hence, likewise, it may be doubted whether friends share a part of the affliction of their friends, as if it were part of a burden. Or is this not the case ; but the presence of friends being delightful, the conception that they participate of the sorrow, produces a diminution of the grief ? Whether, therefore, those who are

in affliction are alleviated through these causes, or through some other cause, we shall omit to investigate. What we have mentioned, however, appears to happen. But the presence of friends appears to be something mixed; for the sight itself of friends is delectable, and especially to those in adverse circumstances, and it becomes a certain auxiliary against affliction. For a friend possesses a consoling power, both in his presence and his words, if he is dexterous; since he knows the manner of his friend, and with what he is pleased and pained. It is painful, however, to perceive that our friend is afflicted by our misfortunes; for every one avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. Hence those who are of a virile nature are careful to prevent their friends from being afflicted in conjunction with themselves; unless they perceive that by subjecting their friends to a little pain, they shall themselves experience an alleviation of great affliction. And, in short, they do not permit others to lament with them, because they are not themselves addicted to lamentation. But women who are weaker than the rest of their sex, (γυναια), and men who resemble them, are delighted with those who groan with them, and love them as their friends, and the associates of their sorrow. In all things, however, it is necessary to imitate the better character. But the presence of friends in prosperity is attended with a pleasing association, and with the conception that they are delighted with our good fortune. Hence, it would seem to be necessary, that in prosperity we should readily and cheerfully invite our friends to partake of our good fortune; for it is beautiful to be beneficent, but that we should be remiss in inviting them to partake of our ill

fortune. For it is requisite to impart to our friends as little as possible of evils. Whence it is said,

That I am wretched, is sufficient."

But friends are then especially to be called upon, when having received small molestations, we can be greatly benefited by their presence. On the contrary, it is perhaps proper to go to those who are in adversity uncalled and cheerfully. For it is the province of a friend to benefit, and especially to benefit those who are in want, and who do not think fit to solicit relief; for this is better and more delectable to both. With fortunate friends, however, we should cheerfully co-operate; for in prosperity also there is need of a friend. But we should slowly betake ourselves to a friend, in order to be benefited by him; for it is not beautiful to be readily and cheerfully disposed to be benefited. It is perhaps, however, requisite to be cautious that we do not conduct ourselves unpleasantly, in rejecting the beneficence of our friends; for this sometimes happens to be eligible in all things.

Whether, therefore, as to lovers the sight of the loved object is most delectable, and they prefer this sense to the rest, because love especially subsists and is produced from this, thus also, it is most eligible to friends to live together? For friendship is communion. And in the same manner as a man is affected towards himself, he is also affected towards his friend. But it is eligible to every one to perceive with respect to himself, [that he exists and lives;] and, therefore, this is also eligible with respect to a friend. This energy, however, is effected among friends by living together; so that this is reasonably desired by them. And that in which to every one his very being consists, or for the sake of which he chooses to live, in this he wishes to pass his life with his friends. Hence some friends indeed drink together, others play at dice together, others engage in gymnastic exercises and hunt together, or philosophize together. But they severally pass their time together, in that to which of all things in life they are most attached. For wishing to live with their friends, they do these things, and communicate with them in these, through which they are of opinion they associate together. The friendship.

therefore, of bad men is depraved; for being unstable, they communicate with each other in bad things; and they become depraved, being assimilated to each other. But the friendship of worthy men is worthy, and is mutually increased by mutual converse. They also appear to become better by energizing with and correcting each other. For they mutually express those things with which they are delighted; whence it is said.

From good men what is good is learnt.

And thus much concerning friendship. It remains to discuss, in the next place, pleasure.