Book VII

After these things, making another beginning, it must be observed by us, that there are three species of things which are to be avoided in manners, viz. vice, incontinence, and brutality. But the contraries to two of these are indeed evident ; for we call one of the contraries virtue, and the other continence. To brutality, however, it will be most appropriate to say, that the virtue is opposed, which is a certain heroical ' and divine virtue,

' Heroical virtue is that virtue by which men act with rectitude, magnificently, and enthusiastically, or under the influence of divine

as Homer represents Priam saying of Hector, that he was a very good man :

inspiration, both in practical affairs, and according to intellectual energy. For the sake of the liberal and philosophical reader, the following account of the heroic character is subjoined, from the manuscript Scholia of Proclus, on the Cratylus. If any apology were necessary for the insertion of this extract, it will be sufficient merely to add, that independent of its excellence, the manuscript from which it is taken, is among the number of the rarest at present existing.

" Every where, the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus, for instance, our master Hermes, (• itwtwf ^fun ic^MK,) being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, daemons ; and they, indeed, are daemons, by nature. Those daemons, however, that are now mentioned, together with the demigods, or heroes, are not daemons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods ; but they are only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent ; and such heroes it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest. This heroic genus of souls, therefore, does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends, indeed, for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downward ; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence, souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods ; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

"Each of the gods, also, is perfectly exempt from secondary natures; and the first, and more total of demons are likewise established above a habitude of this kind. They employ, however, terrestrial and partial spirits in the generations of some of the

[Wretch that I am! my bravest offspring slain! You the disgrace of Priam's house remain!

human race; not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables, therefore, through the similitude of appellation, conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind, are similarly denominated with the gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence, they say, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddesses. But if they were willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; such as the angelical, daemoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers, therefore, of these orders, have much communion with the human race: for the extremities of first, are connascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account it frequently appears, that from the mixture of these powers with men, heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a demoniacal genus of this kind physically sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags, or serpents.

But how is it that at one time the gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods? We reply, that the communion of gods with goddesses gives subsistence to gods, or daemons, eternally; but heroic souls, having a twofold form of life, viz. doxastic and dianoetic, the former of which is called, by Plato, in the Timaeus, the circle of difference, and the latter, the circle of sameness, and which are characterised by the properties of male and female;— hence, these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energising according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or the circle of sameness, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or the circle of difference; yet so, as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves Arist. VOL. II. p

Mestor the brave, renown'd in ranks of war. With Troilus, dreadful in his rushing car ;]

in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise. a providential care over inferior concerns, without, at the same time, having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls which act erroneously, according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical or intellectual virtue— these differ in no respect from gregarious souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all-various fractures and distortions.

" As it is impossible, therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energise, principally according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energise naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called demi-gods, (ἡμίθεοι,) as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of these, therefore, as have the circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life, and are moved about it, according to a deific energy — these are said to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energise without impediment, according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time enthusiastically, or in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity — these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause. Hence, when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal;

Let it, however, be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or producing any partial affection, sympathy, or tendency in illuminating deity.

And last, great Hector, more than man divine. For sure he seem'd not of terrestrial line!

Hence, if, as it is said, men from being men become gods through excess of virtue, the habit which is opposed to a brutal habit, will, indeed, be such as this. For as there is neither the vice nor virtue of a brute, so

but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence too Achilles, in Homer, acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even when in Hades, he desires a union with body, in order that he may assist his father. While, on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no farther than absolute necessity required."

Priam, in Homer, complains that the bravest of his sons, Mestor, Troilus, and Hector, had fallen in battle, and that cowardly sons only survived. I have given the whole passage; for Aristotle only cites what relates to Hector. The passage is to be found in Iliad, 24. v. 255, &c. The translation is by Pope.

The wisest of the ancients never supposed that men, however exalted their virtue might be while living, actually become at length gods; for this was an opinion that prevailed only during the corruption of the heathen religion, and especially during the decline and fall of the Roman empire. This opinion, in short, is diametrically opposite to the most fundamental principles of heathenism, as is evident from the golden verses ascribed to Pythagoras, and from the writings of Plato; not to mention other respectable autho- rities which might be adduced in confirmation of this assertion. It is necessary to observe, therefore, that very good men were said by the ancients to become gods, through the similitude which they bear to divinity. Hence, Plato, in the Sophista, calls the Elean guest, or stranger, a god. In short, as Proclus well observes, Plato, in many places, venerates the participants of the gods by the same names as the gods, and calls them gods. Thus, not only

neither is there of a god; but the one habit, indeed, is more honourable than virtue, and the other is of a different genus from vice. Since, however, the existence of a divine man is rare, (just as the Lacedaemonians, when they very much admire a man, are accustomed to say, O divine man,) thus, also the brutal nature is rare among men; but when it does exist, it is principally found among the barbarians. Some men, however, become brutalized through diseases and mutilations of the body. And we thus denominate, by a defamatory appellation, those who surpass other men in vice. But of such a disposition of the soul as this, we shall hereafter make mention; and we have before spoken concerning vice. Let us now, therefore, speak concerning incontinence, and effeminacy, and luxury, and concerning [their opposites,] continence and endurance. For each of these must not be considered as if they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor yet as if they were of a genus different from them. It is necessary, however, as we have done in other things, having first premised what is

the Athenian guest in the Laws, but also Socrates in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul, a god. Nor is it wonderful that beings who are always united to the gods, and who complete one golden chain together with them, should be denominated gods. Plato, likewise, in many places, calls demons gods, though they are essentially subordinate to, and subsist about the gods. For in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, and other dialogues, you will find that he extends the appellation of gods as far as to daemons.

Hence, according to Plato, and the wisest of the heathens, that nature is simply a god, which is characterised by a superessential unity. Intellectual natures are gods according to union. Divine souls are gods according to participation. Dæmons are gods according to a contact with the gods. And the souls of men are gods through similitude.

apparent [i. e. what is commonly admitted as true,] and proposed doubts, in the next place to show every thing which is especially probable, about these passions ; but if not every thing, at least the greater part, and the principal. For if such doubts as are difficult are dissolved, and those things which are probable are left, we shall have sufficiently accomplished our purpose.

Continence, therefore, and endurance, appear to be among the number of worthy and laudable things ; but incontinence and effeminacy, among the number of things bad and blameable. And the continent man, and he who abides in the decision of reason, are the same person ; and the incontinent man is the same with him who departs from the decision of reason. And the incontinent man, indeed, knowing that the things are bad, does them through passion ; but the continent man, knowing that desires are bad, does not follow them, in consequence of being obedient to reason. And all men, indeed, admit that the temperate man is continent, and possesses the virtue of endurance ; but with respect to a man of this description, some say that he is in every respect temperate, but others say that he is not. And some confusedly say, that the intemperate man is incontinent, and the incontinent man is intemperate; but others say that they differ from each other. But with respect to the prudent man, sometimes they say that he cannot be incontinent ; and sometimes, that certain persons who are prudent and skilful are incontinent. And further still, men are said to be incontinent of anger, of honour, and of gain. Such, therefore, are the assertions concerning continence and incontinence.

It may, however, be doubted, how he who thinks rightly can act incontinently. Some say, therefore, that it is impossible for a man to act incontinently who knows that he ought not ; for it would be a dreadful thing, when science is inherent as Socrates thought, that any thing else should have dominion, and draw the man about like a slave. For Socrates, in short, opposed reason by this opinion, as if there were no such thing as incontinence ; since he said that no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best to do, except from ignorance [of what was best]. This assertion, therefore, is adverse to those things which are clearly apparent ; and it is requisite to inquire concerning the passion, if any one acts incontinently through ignorance, what the mode of this ignorance is ? For it is evident, that he who acts incontinently does not think he ought so to act, till he is under the influence of the passion. There are, however, certain persons who admit some of these things, but not others. For they grant, indeed, that nothing is better than science ; but they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what appears to him to be better. And on this account they say, that the incontinent man, not having science but opinion, is vanquished by pleasures.

If, however, it is opinion, and neither science nor a strong but a weak hypolepsis which resists, as it is in those who are dubious, pardon is to be granted to him who yields to strong desires; but improbity is not to be pardoned, nor any thing else which is blameable. The incontinent man, therefore, is vanquished by desire, prudence at the same time resisting ; for this is most strong. But this is absurd ; for the same person will be, at the same time, prudent and incontinent. No one, however, will say that it is the province of a prudent man to perform voluntarily the most base actions. To which may be added, what we have before shown, that the prudent is a practical man ; for he is conversant with particulars, and possesses the other virtues.

Again, if the continent man consists in having strong and base desires, the temperate man will not be a continent man, nor the continent a temperate man ; for it is not the province of the temperate man to have too much [desire] or to have base desires. But it would be requisite that he should, if this were admitted ; for if, indeed, the desires are good, the habit which prevents a man from following them is bad ; so that not all continence will be good. If, however, the desires are weak, but not bad, there is nothing venerable [in continence;] and if they are bad and weak, there is nothing great in it. Farther still, if continence gives permanency to every opinion, and even to false opinion, it is a bad thing ; and if incontinence produces a departure from every opinion, there will be a certain incontinence which is good ; such as that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles; For he is to. be praised for not persevering in what he was

348 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS BOOK VII

persuaded to do by Ulysses, because it was painful to him to lie. Again, that reasoning of the sophists which is denominated lying or dissembling, is perplexed with doubt. For with these men, in consequence of wishing to produce an assent to paradoxes, in order that when they obtain their end, they may appear to be skilful persons, the syllogism formed by their reasoning becomes very dubious. For the discursive energy of reason is bound, when the person whose assent they wish to procure is unwilling to persist, because the conclusion does not please him ; but is unable to proceed, because he cannot dissolve the argument. From a certain reason, however, it may happen, that imprudence, together with incontinence, is a virtue. For a man through incontinence may do the contrary to what he apprehends ought to be done ; but he apprehends that good things are evil, and that they ought not to be done. Hence, he will do what is good, and not what is evil. Again, he who performs and pursues what is delectable, in consequence of being persuaded, and deliberately choosing so to do, will appear to be a better character than the man who does so, not from reasoning, but from incontinence ; for he may be more easily cured, because he may be induced to change his opinion. But the incontinent man is obnoxious to the proverb, in which we say, " When water suffocates, what occasion is there to drink ?" For if, indeed, he were persuaded to do what he did, if he had been induced to change his opinion he would have desisted ; but now, not being persuaded, he nevertheless acts in this manner. Farther still, if incontinence and continence are conversant with all things, who is the man that is simply incontinent ? For no one has every species of incontinence ; and we say that some persons are simply

incontinent. Such, therefore, are the doubts which happen on this subject. But of these, it is necessary to take away some, and to leave others ; for the solution of a doubt is the discovery [of what is investigated.]

In the first place, therefore, it must be considered, whether the incontinent act knowingly, or not, and in what manner they act knowingly. In the next place, with what kind of things the incontinent and the continent man are conversant. I mean, whether they are conversant with all pleasure and pain, or with certain definite pleasures and pains; and whether the continent and the enduring man are the same, or different characters. And in a similar manner we must consider such other things as are allied to this theory. The beginning, however, of the speculation is, whether the continent and incontinent man differ in the things with which they are conversant, or in the mode in which they are conversant with them. My meaning is this, whether the incontinent man is alone incontinent, or not, because he is conversant with these particular things ? or whether it is because he is thus affected, or not ? or whether it is from both these ? In the next place, whether

incontinence and continence are conversant with all things, or not. For he who is simply incontinent is not conversant with all things, but with those things with which the intemperate man is conversant ; nor is he denominated incontinent from being simply affected towards these ; for if he were, incontinence would be the same with intemperance ; but from being affected towards them in this particular manner. For the intemperate man, indeed, is led [by his desires] from deliberate choice, thinking that it is always necessary to pursue the present delight ; but the incontinent man does not think this is necessary ; yet pursues it. With respect, therefore, to the assertion that it is true opinion and not science, through which men act incontinently, it is of no consequence to the present discussion; for some of those who form opinions of things, entertain no doubt of their truth, but think that they know accurately. If, therefore, those who form an opinion, act in a greater degree contrary to their opinion, than those who have a scientific knowledge, because they believe negligently, science will in no respect differ from opinion. For some persons believe no less firmly in things of which they form an opinion, than others in things which they know scientifically. But this is evident from Heraclitus. Since, however, we say that a man knows scientifically in a two-fold respect ; for both he who possesses science, indeed, but does not use it, and he who uses it, are said to have scientific knowledge ; it makes a difference whether a man possessing science

" Thus Heraclitus fancied that he knew, with scientific accuracy, the things which he opined ; as for instance, that there is no such. thing as motion, and other notions which he maintained. " Paraphrase.

but not contemplating, does what he ought not to do, or whether possessing science and contemplating, he acts improperly. For this appears to be absurd, but it is not if he does not contemplate. Again, since there are two modes of propositions, [i. e. universal and particular propositions,] nothing hinders but that he who possesses both these, may act contrary to science ; using indeed the universal proposition, but not the particular one ; for particulars are practicable. There is a difference, also, as to the universal ; for one difference, indeed, is in the man himself, but the other is in the thing. Thus, for instance, a man may know that dry food is beneficial to every man ; and that this person is a man ; or that a thing of such a kind is dry food ; but whether this is a thing of such a kind, he either does not know, or he does not energise as if he did know. There is an immense difference, therefore, according to these modes ; so that no absurdity follows, for a man thus to know ; but for him to know in any other way, it would be wonderful. Farther still, science may be inherent in men in a way different from that which we have just now mentioned. For we see that habit differs in possessing, indeed, but not using science ; so that a man possesses, in a certain respect, and does not possess science ; as is the case with him who is asleep, or insane, or intoxicated. But in this way men are disposed, who are under the influence of the passions ; for anger, and the desire of venereal pleasures, and certain other things of this kind, evidently produce a change in the body ; and in some persons, also, they produce insanity. It is manifest, therefore, that the incontinent man must be said to be affected similarly to these persons. Nor is it any indication of the contrary, if such persons utter sentences which

are the progeny of science ; for those who are under the influence of these passions, will recite demonstrations, and the verses of Empedocles. And those who first learn [a science] connect indeed the words, but do not yet know their meaning ; for it is necessary that science should increase with advancing age ; but this requires time. Hence, it must be admitted that the incontinent speak after the manner of players, [i. e. without attending to the meaning of what they say. ]

Again, the cause of this may also be physically surveyed as follows : opinion, indeed, is either universal or particular, of which latter sense is now the mistress. But when one reason is produced from both these, it is necessary that, so far as pertains to theory, the soul should enunciate the conclusion, but so far as pertains to practice, should immediately act. Thus, for instance, if every thing sweet ought to be tasted, but this thing is sweet as being some one of particulars, it necessarily follows, that he who is able, and is not impeded, must at the same time that he says this, act, [i. e. taste the sweet thing.] When, therefore, the universal proposition is indeed inherent, which prohibits a thing from being tasted ; but another proposition says, that every thing which is sweet is delectable ; and another, that this particular thing is sweet ; and this causes the man to energise ; and when, also, desire happens to be inherent — then the universal proposition, indeed, says, this thing is to be avoided, but desire leads [to the fruition of it]. For each of the parts of the soul is able to move, or excite. Hence it happens, that a man acts incontinently both from reason, in a certain respect, and opinion ; though opinion is not essentially, but from accident, con-

trary to reason. For desire, but not opinion, is contrary to right reason. Hence, on this account, also, brutes are not incontinent, because they have not a perception of universal, but an imagination and memory of particulars. With respect to the manner, however, in which ignorance is dissolved, and the incontinent man again becomes in possession of scientific knowledge, the reasoning is the same as concerning him who is intoxicated or asleep, and is not peculiar to this passion ; but the explanation of it must be obtained from physiologists. Because, however, the last proposition is the opinion of the sensible object, and is the mistress of actions, he who is under the influence of passion either has not this proposition, or he has it in such a way, that from possessing he has not a scientific knowledge of it, but merely enunciates it, just as he who is intoxicated recites the verses of Empedocles ; and likewise because the last proposition is not universal, and does not appear to be similarly scientific with that proposition which is universal. That also which Socrates investigated, appears in

* Here Aristotle obviously shows, that in apparently opposing Socrates, (or, which is the same thing, Plato,) he in reality explains his opinion. For when, as Aristotle informs us in the 2d chapter, Socrates said, "That no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best to do, except from ignorance of what was best," his meaning was, that no one acted contrary to what he thought was best, when he possessed science properly so called ; viz. when he had not only a scientific knowledge of the universal, but also of the particular proposition. But the incontinent man errs, because he alone knows, scientifically, the universal proposition, that a certain thing universally is not to be done ; but he does not know that this particular thing is not to be done, and that it is not now to be done.

Conformably to this also, Plato says, that all errors are involuntary, because there is need of a false proposition, to the existence

this case to happen. For the passion is not produced, when that which is science, properly so called, is seen to be present ; nor is this science drawn about [so as to cooperate with passion,] but this must be asserted of the sensitive power. And thus much concerning the knowledge and ignorance of the incontinent man, and how he may act incontinently accompanied with knowledge.

But whether any one is simply incontinent, or all that are incontinent are partially so, and if there is any one who is simply incontinent, what the things are with which he is conversant, must in the next place be shown by us. That the continent, therefore, and men of endurance, and that the incontinent and effeminate, are conversant

of error. And the falsehood takes place about the major proposition. Thus Orestes says, " My mother has killed my father: Every woman who kills her own husband ought to be killed : My mother, therefore, ought to be killed. " Here it is evident, that Orestes erred through the major proposition. For though every woman who kills her husband ought to be killed, yet not by her own son. Since, therefore, the major proposition is false, on this account Orestes is said to have erred involuntarily, because we fall into falsehood involuntarily. For no one willingly admits what is false, since all men naturally love truth.

with pleasures and pains, is evident. Of those things, however, which produce pleasure, some indeed are necessary; but others, though they are eligible of themselves, yet have excess. But necessaries, indeed, are things which have reference to the body; I mean such things as pertain to food, and the use of venereal pleasures, and such-like corporeal concerns, about which we place intemperance and temperance. Other things, however, are not indeed necessary, yet are eligible of themselves; I mean such as victory, honour, wealth, and such-like good and delectable things. Those, therefore, who exceed in these contrary to the right reason which is in them, we do not indeed denominate simply incontinent, but with an addition we call them incontinent of riches, of gain, of honour, and of anger; but we do not call them simply incontinent, as being different from those that are so, and denominated from similitude; just as the name of a certain person who was victorious in the Olympic games, was Anthropos, i. e. man; for he had as a proper the common name of man, and yet at the same time he was different [from man universal, or the species man, as being an individual.] As an indication of this, incontinence indeed is blamed, not only as an error, but also as a certain vice, either simply, or partially; but no one blames those who are incontinent of honour, or gain, &c. as simply bad. With respect, however, to those who are conversant with corporeal enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and intemperate man are conversant, he who without deliberate choice pursues the excesses of delectable, and avoids the excesses of painful things, viz. hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and every thing pertaining to the touch and the taste, yet contrary to deliberate choice and the reasoning

power, is called incontinent, not with an addition of this or that thing, as of anger, but he is only simply called incontinent. But as an indication of this, those who are conversant with the one are called effeminate, but not those who are conversant with the other. Hence, we arrange the incontinent and intemperate, and also the continent and temperate man, in the same class, but not those who are incontinent of honour, or gain, &c. because they are, in a certain respect, conversant with the same pleasures and pains. Though, however, they are conversant with the same things, yet not after the same manner; for the intemperate, indeed, pursue depraved pleasures from deliberate choice, but the incontinent do not. Hence, we rather call him intemperate, who either not at all desiring, or desiring slightly, pursues excessive pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, than him who pursues the one and avoids the other, in consequence of being influenced by vehement desire. For what would the former character do if he were impelled by robust desire, and suffered violent pain from the want of necessary things ? Since, however, of desires and pleasures, some rank in the genus of things beautiful and worthy ; for of things delectable, some are naturally eligible, others are contrary to these, and others have an intermediate subsistence, agreeably to the division we have before made ; and these last are such as riches, gain, victory, and honour : in all these, therefore, and things of the like kind, and in those that have an intermediate subsistence, men are not blamed for being merely influenced by the passions, and for desiring and loving, but for the manner in which they are influenced by them, and for indulging them to excess. Hence, with respect to those who are vanquished by the passions, or

pursue any thing naturally beautiful and good, contrary to reason, such as those who pursue honour more than is proper, or are irrationally attached to their parents and children ; for these also rank among the number of things that are good, and those who pay attention to these are praised ; yet there is at the same time a certain excess even in these things, if any one, like Niobe, contends about them even with the gods, or like Satyrus, who for his attachment to his father was called Philopator; for he appeared through this attachment to be very infatuated. There is, therefore, no depravity, indeed, in these things, for the reason already assigned, because each of these things is naturally eligible of itself; but the excesses of them are bad, and are to be avoided. This, however, is not the case with incontinence ; for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but is also among the number of blameable things. But from the similitude of the passion, in speaking about each of these, it is usual to add the term incontinence, just as we say, that a man is a bad physician, or a bad player, whom we should not simply call a bad man. As, therefore, we do not here call these, simply bad men, because each of these is not a vice, but similar to vice from analogy ; so likewise there, [viz. in the immoderate pursuit of honour, gain, &c.] those things only are to be considered as incontinence and continence, which are conversant with the same things as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to incontinence in anger, we speak of it from similitude. Hence, also, by making an addition, we say that a man is incontinent of anger, just as we say, that he is incontinent of honour or gain.

Since, however, some things are naturally delectable, and of these some are simply so, but others to the genera of animals and men ; but other things are not naturally delectable, but some things are pleasing in consequence of mutilations, and others are so partly from custom, and partly from depraved natures — this being the case, similar habits may be perceived in each of these. But by savage habits, I mean such a habit as that of the woman who is said to have cut open the bellies of pregnant women, and to have devoured the foetus ; or such habits as certain savage nations about Pontus are said to possess. For of these, some are delighted to feed on raw, and others on human flesh, and others at banquets feast each other with their own children. Or such a habit as Phalaris is said to have possessed, [for he is reported to have eaten his own son. ] These habits, therefore, are savage. Some of these habits, however, are produced in certain persons from disease and insanity, as was the case with him who immolated and eat his mother, and also with him who eat the liver of his fellow-

into ΑΦΡΑΣΙΑΝ.— i. e. " Xerxes, king of the Persians, being insane, eat his mother, having for this purpose torn her in pieces."

servant. But other savage habits, either originate from disease, or from custom, such as evulsions of the hairs, biting the nails, and besides these eating coals and earth ; to which may be added the venereal connexion of males with males. For these habits are produced in some persons by nature, but in others from custom ; as being accustomed to them from childhood. No one, therefore, would call those in whom nature is the cause of these habits, incontinent ; as neither are women called incontinent, because in the venereal connexion they are not active, but passive. And in a similar manner those are not called incontinent, who are in a diseased condition from custom. The possession, therefore, of each of these, is something beyond the boundaries of vice, in the same manner as a savage nature. But when possessing these propensities, to subdue or be subdued by them, is not simple continence or incontinence, but is only so from similitude, just as he who subsists after this manner with respect to anger is incontinent of this passion, but passion is not to be called incontinent. For every vice, folly, timidity, intemperance and ferocity, when excessive, is either savage or the effect of disease. For he who is naturally so disposed as to be afraid of every thing, even though a mouse should make a noise, is timid according to a savage timidity; but he who is afraid of a cat is timid from disease. And among the number of the stupid, those who are most irrational from nature, and live only from sense, resemble savage animals, as is the case with some nations of remote barbarians ; but those who are so from disease, such as epilepsy, or insanity, these are in a morbid state. It is, however, possible, that some one may sometimes possess these habits, and yet not be

vanquished by them ; I mean, as if, for instance, Phalaris desiring to eat his son should refrain from so doing, or should abstain from absurd venereal pleasure. And it is not only possible to have these propensities, but also to be vanquished by them. As, therefore, with respect to depravity, that which pertains to man, is simply said to be depravity ; but that which subsists with an addition, is said to be a savage or diseased depravity, but is not simple depravity ; after the same manner with respect to incontinence, it is evident that one kind is savage but another the effect of disease, while that alone is simply incontinence which subsists according to human intemperance. It is evident, therefore, that incontinence and continence are alone conversant with those things with which intemperance and temperance are conversant, and that another species of incontinence subsists about other things, which is denominated metaphorically, and not simply.

Let us, however, now consider whether the incontinence of anger is not less base than the incontinence of desires. For anger, indeed, seems to hear something of reason, but to hear it negligently ; just like hasty servants, who run away before they have heard the whole of what is said to them, and thus err in the performance of what they are ordered to do ; or like dogs who bark at a noise alone, before they perceive whether he who makes it is a friend or not. Thus also anger, through the heat and celerity of its nature, hears, indeed, reason, but does not hear its mandates, in consequence of impetuously tending to vengeance. For reason, indeed, or the imagination, renders it evident that something has been done attended with insolence or contempt ; but anger, as if syllogistically concluding that it is necessary to be hostile to one who has acted in this manner, is immediately enraged. Desire, however, if sense, or reason [corrupted by sense] only says that a thing is delectable, rushes to the enjoyment of it. Hence, anger in a certain respect follows reason ; but desire does not. Desire, therefore, is more base than anger. For he who is incontinent of anger, is after a manner vanquished by reason ; but he who is incontinent of desire, is subdued by desire, and not by reason. Again, it is more pardon-

able to follow the natural appetites, since such desires as are common to all men are more pardonable, and so far as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than desires which are excessive, and which are not necessary. Thus one who was accused of striking his father said, as an apology for it, that his own father, and even his grandfather, committed the same fault ; and pointing to his child, he likewise, said he, will strike me when he becomes a man ; for this is a family failing. A certain person, also, being dragged about by his son, ordered him to stop at the gates of his house ; for he likewise had dragged his father as far as to that place. Farther still, those who act more insidiously are more unjust. The irascible man, therefore, is not insidious, nor is anger, but he is open in what he does. Desire^ however, is fraudulent, as it is said of Venus,

Tlae Cyprian goddess, skill'd in weaving wiles.'

And as Homer says, [speaking of her cestus, J

In this was every art, and every charm. To win the wisest, and the coldest warm ; Fond love, the gentle vow, the gaj desire. The kind deceit, the still reviving fire. Persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs. Silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes. •

Hence, if this incontinence is more unjust, it is dso more base than that which pertains to anger, and this is mk»

■ Iliad, 14, V. 214, &c. The translation by Pope. I hav« given the whole passage to which Aristotle alludes ; for he only quotes the two last words of t^e first line of the original and the last line.

ply incontinence, and in a certain respect vice. Again, no one who is pained acts insolently [i. e. lasciviou8ly3 to'nrards another person ; but every one who acts from the impulse of anger, acts with pain. He, however, who conducts himself insolently towards another, acts with pleasure. If, therefore, those things with which it is especially just to be angry are more unjust, the incontinence, also, which subsists through desire is more unjust; for anger is not attended with insolence. Hence, it is evident that the incontinence which is conversant with desires, is more base than that which is conversant with anger, and, also, that continence and incontinence are conversant with corporeal pleasures. The differences, however, of these must be assumed. For, as we said in the beginning, some desires are human and natural, both in their genus and magnitude; but others are savage; and others subsist from mutilations and diseases. But with the first of these, temperance and intemperance are alone conversant. Hence, we neither call brutes temperate, nor intemperate, except metaphorically, though one genus of animals differs in short from another, in insolence, in salaciousness, and in voracity. For they have neither any deliberate choice, nor reasoning process; but they revolt from nature, in the same manner as insane men. Ferocity, however, is a less evil than vice, but it is more terrible; for that which is most excellent, is not corrupted through this, as it is in men; but those that labour under this malady are deprived of it, [i. e. of reason.] It is just, therefore, as if that which is inanimate should be compared with that which is animated, in order

By ὕβρις here, or insolence, Aristotle probably means the insolence which accompanies lasciviousness.

to know which of the two is the worse. For the improbity is always more innoxious which is without a principle; but intellect is a principle. Hence, a similar thing takes place, as if injustice should be compared with an unjust man; for it is possible that the one may be worse than the other. For a bad man may be the cause of an infinitely greater number of evils than a brute.

With respect, however, to the pleasures and pains which subsist through the touch and the taste, and also with respect to the desires and aversions pertaining to these, about which intemperance and temperance have been before defined ; it is possible, indeed, that a man may be so disposed, as to be vanquished by those pleasures and pains, to which the multitude are superior ; and it is also possible, that he may vanquish those by which the multitude are vanquished. But of these characters, he who is vanquished by pleasures is incontinent, and he who vanquishes them is continent. He, also, who is vanquished by pains is effeminate, but he who vanquishes them is a man of endurance. The habits, however, of most men are between these, though they rather verge to the worse habits. Since, however, of pleasures

some are necessary, but others are not, and those that are necessary are so to a certain extent ; but the excesses and defects are not necessary ; and the like also takes place in desires and pains ; — this being the case, he who pursues the excesses of pleasures, or who pursues pleasures excessively, or from deliberate choice, and on their own account, and not from any thing else which may happen, is an intemperate man. For this man will necessarily not repent of his conduct ; so that he is incurable. But he who is deficient in the pursuit of pleasures, is opposed to this character; and he who subsists in a medium between both, is the temperate man. In a similar manner, also, he is intemperate, who avoids corporeal pains, not because he is vanquished by them, but from deliberate choice. But of those who pursue pleasures, yet not from deliberate choice, one, indeed, is led to the pursuit through pleasure ; but another through an avoidance of pain ; so that they differ from each other. It will, however, be obvious to every one, that he is a worse character, who not desiring, or desiring but slightly, does any thing which is base, than him who desires vehemently; and also that he who not being angry strikes a man, is a worse character than the man who strikes another through the impulse of anger. For what would such a one do, if he were influenced by passion ? Hence, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man. Of the characters, therefore, that we have mentioned, the one has more the form of effeminacy, but the other is incontinent. But the continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the man of endurance to the effeminate man. For endurance, indeed, consists in resisting, but continence in subduing. It is one thing, however, to resist, and another to subdue, just as it is one thing not to be

vanquished, and another to vanquish. Hence, continence is more eligible than endurance. But he who fails in those things in which the multitude resist, and are able to resist, is effeminate and luxuriously delicate. For luxurious delicacy is a certain effeminacy; as when a man draws his garment on the ground lest he should be pained by the labour of holding it up; and [by his manner of living] imitates one who is ill, yet does not think he is miserable, though he resembles one who is miserable. The like, also, takes place with respect to continence and incontinence. For it is not wonderful if a man is vanquished by strong and transcendent pleasures or pains; but he deserves to be pardoned, if, though vanquished, he makes a resistance, like the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when bit by a viper, or the Cercyon of Carcinus in his Alope; or like those who endeavouring to restrain their laughter burst forth into a profuse laugh, as it happened to Xenophantus. But he is very blameable who is vanquished by those pleasures which the multitude are able to resist, and is unable to oppose them; and this not through the nature of his race, or from disease, as is the case with the Persian kings, with whom effeminacy is hereditary, and who on this account are as females when compared to males. The jocose man, also, appears to be intemperate, but he is effeminate; for jesting is a relaxation, since it is a repose [from serious and laborious pursuits.] But the jocose man ranks among the number of those who exceed in

* Carcinus was a tragic poet, and Alope was the daughter of Cercyon, who, understanding that the chastity of his daughter had been violated, could no longer bear to live, through the grief which he felt on the occasion. * Astasids.

this relaxation. With respect to incontinence, however, one kind is precipitate, but another is from imbecility. For some, indeed, having deliberated, do not persist in what they have deliberated, on account of passion ; but others, in consequence of not having deliberated, are led [captive] by passion. For some persons, just as those who have previously tickled themselves, are not tickled by others, so these, in consequence of previously perceiving, and foreseeing [the future perturbation,] and having pre-excited themselves, and their reasoning power, are not vanquished by passion, whether it be delectable, or painful. But persons of acute feelings, and those who are melancholy, are especially incontinent, according to precipitate incontinence. For the former, indeed, through celerity, and the latter through vehemence, do not wait for the decision of reason, because they are disposed to follow the imagination.

The intemperate man, however, as we have before observed, is not inclined to repentance ; for he persists in his deliberate choice ; but every incontinent man is inclined to repent. Hence, the thing is not as we doubted it might be ; but the intemperate man, indeed.

is incurable, and the incontinent man is curable. For depravity appears to resemble the diseases of the dropsy and consumption, but incontinence seems to resemble the epilepsy ; since the former, indeed, is continued without interruption, but the latter is not a continued improbity. And, in short, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice; for vice, indeed, is latent, but incontinence is not latent. But of these characters, the precipitately incontinent are better than those who possess reason, indeed, but do not abide in its decisions ; for the latter are vanquished by a less passion, and not without previous deliberation, like the former. For the man who is incontinent from imbecility, resembles those who become rabidly intoxicated, and from a little wine, and from less than that through which most men become intoxicated. That incontinence, therefore, is not a vice is evident ; but perhaps it is partially so. For incontinence is contrary, but vice is conformable to deliberate choice. The intemperate, and the incontinent man, however, are similar in their actions, just as Demodocus said of the Milesians : viz. "The Milesians are not indeed foolish, yet they act as if they were so. Thus, also, incontinent men are not indeed unjust, yet they act unjustly. Since, therefore, the incontinent man is one who does not pursue corporeal pleasures in excess and contrary to right reason, from persuasion, but the intemperate man because he is intemperate is persuaded to pursue such pleasures ; — this being the case, the former is easily induced to change his opinion, but the latter is not. For virtue preserves the principle [of right conduct,] but depravity corrupts it ; and in actions that for the sake of which [or the end] is the principle, in the same manner as hypotheses are principles in the mathematics. Hence, neither in the

mathematics, nor here, are principles to be taught ; but virtue, either physical or ethical, is the cause of right opinion concerning the principle [of conduct.] A man of this description, therefore, is temperate, but the contrary character is an intemperate man. There is also a certain person who through passion departs from right reason, whom passion, indeed, so subdues, that he does not act conformably to right reason ; but yet passion does not so far subdue him as to cause him to be persuaded, that pleasures of this description ought to be largely pursued. This person is the incontinent man, who is better than the intemperate, and is not absolutely a bad man. For in him that which is best, the principle [of right conduct,] is saved. But there is another person contrary to this [viz. the continent man,] who persists [in the decision of reason,] and is not diverted from it through passion. From these things, therefore, it is evident, that one of these habits is worthy, but the other bad.

WHETHER, therefore, is he the continent man, who persists in any kind of reason, and in any kind of deliberate choice, or he who persists in right reason ? And whether is he the incontinent man, who does not persist in any kind of deliberate choice, nor in any kind of reason, or he who persists in a false reason, and in an erroneous, deliberate choice, as it was doubted by us before ? Or shall we say that the continent man is one who persists from accident in any kind of reason and deliberate choice, but essentially in true reason, and right deliberate choice, but that the incontinent man does not thus persist ? For if any one chooses, or pursues, that thing on account of this, he pursues, indeed, and chooses this thing per se ; but the former thing from accident. We speak, however, of that which is per se simply. Hence, it is possible that the one may persist in any kind of opinion, but that the other may abandon any kind of opinion ; but the one simply persists in true opinion, and the other does not. There are, however, some persons who are disposed to persist in an opinion, and these are those who are called pertinacious, such as the obstinate, and those who are not easily persuaded to relinquish their opinion, who have, indeed, something similar to the continent man, in the

same manner as the prodigal has to the liberal, and the audacious to the confident man ; but in many things they are different. For the confident man, indeed, is not changed through passion and desire ; since when it so happens, he is easily persuaded. But the pertinacious man is not persuaded by reason ; since most of this description admit desire, and are led by pleasures. Those persons, however, are pertinacious, who have certain opinions of their own, and also unlearned and rustic men. And those, indeed, who have certain opinions of their own, are pertinacious through pleasure and pain. For they rejoice when they are victorious, if they are not induced to change their opinion, and they are grieved when their opinions, as if they were decrees, are without efficacy. Hence, they resemble the incontinent more than the continent man. But there are certain persons who do not persist in their opinions, yet not through incontinence, such as Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles ; since he did not persist in his opinion, yet, not on account of pleasure, but on account of the beautiful in conduct. For to him it was beautiful to speak the truth, though he was persuaded by Ulysses to lie. For not every one who does any thing on account of pleasure is intemperate, or a bad, or an incontinent man ; but he is intemperate who does it on account of base pleasure. Since, however, there is a character of such a kind as to be delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures, and not to abide in the decisions of reason, the continent man is a medium between this character and the incontinent man. For the incontinent man, indeed, does not abide in the decisions of reason, because he is delighted with corporeal pleasures more than is proper, but this man, because he is delighted with them less than is pro-

per. The continent man, however, abides in the decision of reason, and is not changed through any thing else. It is also necessary, if continence is a good thing, that both the contrary habits should be bad, as it appears that they are. Because, however, one of these characters [viz. the man who is delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures,] exists but among a few men, and is rarely seen ; hence, as temperance appears to be contrary to intemperance alone, thus, also, continence to incontinence. But since many things are denominated from similitude, the continence also of the temperate man follows according to similitude. For both the continent and the temperate man, do nothing contrary to reason, through the influence of corporeal pleasures ; but the one, indeed, [viz. the continent man] possesses, but the other does not possess depraved desires. And the one, indeed, is a man of such a description, as not to be delighted contrary to reason, but the other is delighted, indeed, yet is not led by this delight. The incontinent, and the intemperate man, also resemble each other, though, indeed, they are different characters. Both, however, pursue corporeal delights ; but the latter, indeed, thinking that it is proper, and the other not thinking that it is proper, to pursue them.

Nor is it possible that the same person can at one and the same time be prudent and incontinent ; for it has been shown by us that a prudent man, is at the same time a man of worthy manners. Again, a man is not only prudent from knowing what ought to be done, but also from acting properly ; but the incontinent man does not act properly. Nothing, however, prevents the incontinent man from being skilful. Hence, also, sometimes certain persons appear to be prudent, but incontinent, because skilfulness differs from prudence, in the way we have before explained ; and these, so far as pertains to reason, indeed, are near to each other, but they differ according to deliberate choice. Neither, therefore, does the incontinent man [possess reason] as one who knows and contemplates, but as one who is asleep, or intoxicated. And he acts, indeed, voluntarily ; for after a certain manner he acts knowing both what he does, and for the sake of what he acts as he does. But he is not depraved ; for his deliberate choice is good ; so that he is half depraved, and not unjust, because he is not insidious. For one incontinent man, indeed, [i. e. the man who is incontinent from debility] does not persist in what he has deliberated ; and he who is of a melancholy temperament, Arist. VOL. II. R

[i. e. the man who is precipitately incontinent,] is not, in short, disposed to deliberate. The incontinent man, therefore, resembles a city, which decrees, indeed, every thing that is proper, and has good laws, but uses none of them, as Anaxandrides revilingly said.

The state consults, but its own laws neglects.

But the bad man resembles a city, which uses indeed laws, but uses bad laws. Incontinence, however, and continence, are conversant with that which exceeds the habit of the multitude ; for the continent man persists more, but the incontinent man less, than the multitude are able to do, [In the decisions of reason.] The incontinence, however, of the melancholy, is more easily cured, than the incontinence of those who deliberate, indeed, but do not persist in doing what they have deliberated to do. Those, also, who are incontinent from custom, may be more easily cured than those who are naturally so ; for it is more easy to change custom than nature. For on this very account it is difficult to change custom, viz. because it resembles nature, as Evenus also says,

By long attention custom is produc'd. And is at length as nature to mankind.

We have shown, therefore, what continence and incontinence, and also what endurance and effeminacy are, and how these habits subsist with reference to each other.

This discussion, however, of pleasure and pain, pertains to him who philosophizes about the political science ; for he is the architect [as it were] of the end, looking to which we say that one thing is evil, but another is simply good. Again, it is likewise necessary that we should make these the objects of consideration. For we admit that ethical virtue and vice are conversant with pleasures and pains ; and most men assert that felicity is accompanied with pleasure. Hence, also, they denominate the blessed man (μακάριον) from especially rejoicing (από του μάλιστα χαίρειν.) To some, therefore, no pleasure appears to be good, neither essentially, nor from accident ; for good and pleasure are not the same thing. But to others, some pleasures appear to be good, but many of them to be bad. Others again in the third place assert, that though all pleasures were good, yet at the same time that which is most excellent cannot be pleasure. In short, therefore, they say, pleasure is not good, because all pleasure is a generation tending to a sensible nature [as to its end]; but no generation is allied to ends ; as no act of building a house, i. e. the energy of building, οικοδομησις, is allied to the house. Again, the temperate man avoids pleasures. Farther still, the prudent man pursues a free-

dom from pain, and not the delectable. To which may be added, that pleasures are an impediment to the energy of prudence, and this in proportion to the delight which they afford ; as is the case with venereal pleasure. ; for no one, when engaged in this pleasure, can intellectually perceive any thing. Again, pleasure is not the offspring of art ; though every thing which is good, is the work of art. Farther still, children and brutes pursue pleasures. But that all pleasures are not worthy is indicated by this, that some are base, and disgraceful, and pernicious ; for some pleasures produce disease. It is also evident that pleasure is not the best of things, because it is not an end, but generation. Such, therefore, nearly are the assertions respecting pleasure.

That it does not happen, however, from these arguments that pleasure is neither good, nor the best of things, is evident from the following considerations: — In the first place, indeed, because good is predicated in a twofold respect ; for one kind of good is simply and absolutely good, but another is good to a certain person. And natures and habits receive the same division ; so that this will also be the case with motions and generations. With respect to those pleasures likewise which appear to

be bad, some indeed are simply bad, but are not bad to a certain person, but to him are eligible; and some are not pleasures to this person,. except once and for a short time, but they are not eligible to him. And some are not pleasures, but only appear to be so, viz. those which are attended with pain, and are for the sake of a remedy, such as those of the sick. Again, since of good one kind is energy, but another is habit, those pleasures which restore their possessor to his natural habit are delectable. In desires, however, there is the energy of an indigent and imperfect habit and nature. There are also pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain and desire, such as the energies of contemplation, nature in these not being indigent. But that some pleasures are delectable of themselves, and others only on account of the indigence which they remove, is indicated by this, that men are not pleased with the same delectable thing when the indigence of nature is removed, and when it is not. For, in the former case, they are delighted with things simply and absolutely pleasant ; but in the latter, with their contraries. For they are then delighted with things sharp and bitter, none of which are either naturally, or absolutely delectable ; so that neither are they pleasures. For as things delectable are to each other, so likewise are the pleasures produced by these. Farther still, it is not necessary that something else should be better than pleasure, as some say the end of generation is better than generation ; for pleasures are not generations, nor are all of them accompanied with generation, but they are energies, and an end. Nor do pleasures happen when things are passing into existence, but from the use of things. Nor is the end of all pleasures something different from them, but of those only which lead

to the perfection of nature. Hence, it is not well said, that pleasure is a sensible generation ; but it must rather be said that it is the energy of habit according to nature ; and instead of saying that it is a sensible, it must be said that it is an unimpeded generation. It appears, however, to be a certain generation, because it is properly good ; for they fancied that energy is generation ; but it is different from it. To say, also, that pleasures are bad, because some delectable things produce diseases, is what may likewise be said of things salubrious ; for some of these are bad as to pecuniary affairs. In this respect, therefore, both will be bad, and yet they are not on this account bad. For contemplation is likewise sometimes injurious to health; yet the. pleasure proceeding from each habit, is neither an impediment to prudence, nor to any habit; but the pleasures which are an impediment to these are such as are foreign ; since the pleasures arising from contemplation and discipline, produce in a greater degree contemplation and learning. But it reasonably happens that no pleasure is the work of art ; since neither is there an art of any other energy but of power ; though the arts pertaining to unguents and cooking appear to be the arts of pleasure. With respect to the assertions, also, that the temperate man avoids pleasures, and that the prudent man pursues a life unattended with pain, and that children and brutes pursue pleasure — all these are solved after the same manner. For since we have shown how all pleasures are, in a certain respect, simply good, and how they are not good, hence, children and brutes pursue such pleasures as are accompanied with desire and pain, and are corporeal, and the prudent man pursues a freedom of pain from these ; for of such a kind are these pleasures ; [viz. they are accompanied with pain.] Child-

ren and brutes also pursue the excesses of these according to which the intemperate man becomes intemperate. Hence, the temperate man avoids these ; since there are also pleasures which belong to the temperate man.

It is also admitted, that pain is an evil and is to be avoided ; for one kind of pain, indeed, is simply evil, but another in a certain respect, because it is an impediment. That, however, which is contrary to what is to be avoided, so far as it is something to be avoided and is evil, is good. Pleasure, therefore, is necessarily something good. For the solution of Speusippus is not appropriate, viz. that pleasure is contrary to pain, just as the greater is contrary to the less and the equal ; since no one will say that pleasure is a certain evil. But nothing prevents a certain pleasure from being the best of things, if certain pleasures are bad, just as a certain science, [viz. wisdom,] is the best of sciences, though some sciences are bad. Perhaps too, it must necessarily be the case, that if of every habit

If pleasure is opposed to pain, as the greater is to the less and the equal, then it will be opposed as excess to defect ; and pleasure will be of itself an evil.

380 THE NICOMACHEAN . BOOK VII.

there are unimpeded energies, whether felicity is the energy of all the habits, or of some one of them, this energy, if it is unimpeded, is most eligible. But this is pleasure ; so that a certain pleasure will be the best of things, many pleasures, if it should so happen, being simply bad. And on this account all men are of opinion that a happy is a delectable life, and they reasonably connect pleasure with felicity. For no energy is perfect when it is impeded ; but felicity is among the number of perfect energies. Hence, the happy man requires the goods pertaining to the body, and external possessions, and also good fortune, lest [the want of] these should be an impediment [to his felicity.] Those, however, who say, that a man, if he is a good man, may be happy, though he should be tormented in a wheel, and fall into the greatest calamities, say nothing to the purpose,' whether they assert this willingly or unwittingly. Because, however, the happy man requires good fortune, prosperity appears to some persons to be the same with felicity, though it is not the same; since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity. Perhaps, likewise, it is no longer just to call prosperity [when it is excessive] good fortune ; for the definition of prosperity has a reference to felicity. That all brutes too, and all men, pursue pleasure, is an indication that pleasure is in a certain respect the best of things.

That fame which crowds of human kind extol. Will ne'er completely perish.

' The distinction mentioned in a former note must here be carefully remembered, viz. that the felicity of the worthy man, in the most calamitous circumstances, will not be essentially destroyed, but will be as it were in a dormant state.

Because, however, neither the same nature, nor the same habit, either is, nor appears to be the best, neither do all men pursue the same pleasure, though pleasure is pursued by all men. Perhaps, also, they pursue not the pleasure which they fancy, nor that which they say they pursue, but the same pleasure; for all things natural possess something divine. Corporeal pleasures, however, obtain the inheritance of the name, because men are for the most part occupied in them, and all animals partake of them. Because, therefore, these pleasures alone are [generally] known, these are the only pleasures which are fancied to have an existence. It is, however, evident, that unless pleasure is good, and also energy, it will not be possible for the happy man to live delectably. For on what account would delight be requisite to a happy life,

* This is most Platonically said by Aristotle, that all men pursue the same pleasure, by which he means the pleasure which is good; because all things naturally possess something divine. For in consequence of every thing possessing this symbol, or impression of divinity in its essence, there is in every thing an innate desire of the first principle, as the end of all things; and hence, prior to appetite, there is a certain occult perception of that which is first. Hence, too, in consequence of this natural sense or perception, which is entirely concealed from the other senses, things heavy and light choose in a rectilinear direction a place adapted to their natures, and reject the contrary. Hence, the roots of trees pursue moisture, and avoid dryness; and leaves sagaciously turn from the shade, and joyfully associate to themselves the light of the sun, in conjunction with his invigorating warmth. Through this wonderful sense and appetite, therefore, all things are converted to the first without knowing the first; and as the great Theodorus, the Platonist, says, "All things pray except the first. " In a similar manner, also, the soul, prior to manifest knowledge and the election of the will, from a natural sense and inclination impressed in her essence through the one, desires the one itself.

if it is not good? But it would also be possible for life to be happy, though attended with pain; for pain will neither be evil nor good, if pleasure is not good. Why, therefore, is pain to be avoided? Neither, therefore, will the life of the worthy man be more delectable, unless his energies are more delectable.

With respect, however, to corporeal pleasures, we must direct our attention to the assertions of those who say, that some pleasures are very eligible, viz. such as are worthy ; but not corporeal pleasures, with which the intemperate man is conversant. Why, therefore, are the pains contrary to these pleasures depraved ? For good is contrary to evil. Or shall we say, that necessary pleasures are so far good, because that which is not evil is good, or that they are good to a certain extent ? For in those habits and motions, in which there is no excess of that which is better, there is no excess of pleasure ; but in those in which there is an excess of what is better, there is also an excess of pleasure. But of corporeal goods there is an excess ; and the bad man becomes bad by pursuing the excess of pleasure, and not necessary

pleasures. For all depraved men are delighted with meats and wine, and venery, but not in such a manner as is proper. And they are affected in a contrary way with respect to pain ; for they do not avoid the excess of pain, but pain altogether. For pain is not contrary to excess, but to him who pursues excess. Since, however, it is not only necessary to speak the truth, but also to assign the cause of a false assertion ; for this contributes to credibility ; since when the cause why a thing seems to be true, though it is not, appears to be reasonable, it then gives greater credibility to the truth ; — this being the case, it must be shown why corporeal pleasures appear to be more eligible. In the first place, therefore, they appear to be so, because they expel pain, and because excessive, and in short, corporeal pleasure is pursued on account of the excesses of pain, as a remedy. But the remedies are vehement, and on this account corporeal pleasures are pursued, because they become more apparent when placed by that which is contrary to them. Pleasure, therefore, does not appear to be good, for these two reasons, as we have before observed ; because some pleasures, indeed, are the actions of a depraved nature, either from the birth of the animal, as those of a brute, or they originate from custom, such as those of bad men ; but other pleasures are remedies, because they are the pleasures of that which is in want, and it is better to have them, than for them to be passing into existence; and others happen to be the pleasures of that which is in a perfect condition.* From accident, therefore, they

* i. e. When desire is satisfied, as Aspasius explains the word τελειουμένων ; or according to the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, " when those who desire are perfected, and restored to an entire condition of nature. '*

384 THE KICOM ACHBAN . BOOK VC^

are worthy pleasures. Again, pleasures diat are vehe^ ment, are pursued by those ndio are incapable of beings delighted with other pleasures^ These, therefore, pro-, aire for themselves certain thirsts. Hence» when plea* sures are innoxious, they are not to be reprehended ; bur when they are noxious, they are bad. For those that pursue these pleasures have no other with which thejr are delighted; and if neither these, nor any others are present, the vulgar are in pain» through [the indigence (tf 3 nsiture. For the animal always bbours,. as phy^cal^ arguments testify, since, as physiologists say, to see and to hear are painful, but we are now. accustomed to these [energies, and therefore do not perceive the pain]. In a similar manner in youth, in consequence of the augment tation which then takes place, we are affected like those who are intoxicated, and youth is a ddectable [period of human life]. But the melancholic naturally always require a remedy ; for their body exjleriences a continual mdestationfrom its temperament, [through the acrimony of the bile ;] and they are always agitated with vehement appetite. Pleasure, however, always expels pain, as well the pain which is contrary to pleasure, as that which is^ casual, if the pleasure Is strong ; and on this account the melancholic become intemperate and depraved. But the pleasures which are without pain have no excess ; and these are such as are derived from things naturally delectable, and which are not accidentally so. I mean, however, by things delectable from accident, remedies ; f^r because it happens that we are cured of a malady, the part which is sane performing something, on this account, the remedies appear to be delectable. But by things naturally delectable, I mean, those which produce the action of such a nature, [i. e. which produce an

energy essentially adapted to such a nature]. Nothing, however, which remains the same, is always delectable, because our nature is not simple, but there is also something in it different, according to which it is corruptible.'

' Aristotle, in asserting that our nature contains something which is different, and through which it is corruptible, evidently alludes to, and accords with the doctrine of his divine master Plato, in the Timæus, respecting the composition of the soul. For he there composes it from essence, sameness, and difference. To understand which, it is necessary to observe, that there are five genera of beings from which all things, after the first being, are composed ; viz. essence, permanency, motion, sameness, and difference. For every thing must possess essence ; must abide in its cause, from which, also, it must proceed, and to which it must be converted; must be the same with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time different from others, and distinguished in itself. Plato, however, for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the soul, viz. essence, sameness, and difference; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. As sameness, therefore, predominates in intelligible and impartible essences, but difference in things sensible and partible, hence the soul, by its alliance to a sensible nature, contains in itself something which is different, and through which, in its irrational part, it is subject to the fatality of death. For, again, Plato in the same dialogue asserts that the soul is a medium between an essence indivisible, and always subsisting according to sameness of being, and a nature divisible about bodies ; viz. it is a medium between intellect, and the whole of a corporeal life.

When Aristotle also says, that nothing which remains the same is always delectable to us, because our nature is not simple, we may hence infer, that it is impossible for the human soul always to remain in one condition of being, though that condition should be attended with the highest felicity of which it is capable. Hence, as the rational soul is immortal, it must necessarily circulate. For when in a state of the most exalted felicity, becoming at length weary of its blessedness, it gradually falls into a subordinate condition of being, and from this fallen condition, again gradually rises to the acme of its felicity.

Hence, if the one part does any thing, this to the other nature is preternatural. But when both the parts are equalized, that which is performed, neither appears to be painful nor pleasing. For if there is any being, the nature of which is simple, to this being the same action will always be most delectable. Hence, God always rejoices according to one simple pleasure; for there is not only an energy of [corporeal] motion, but also of immobility; and pleasure exists more abundantly in rest than in motion. But mutation is the sweetest of all things, according to the poet, through a certain depravity. For as a depraved man is mutable, so likewise is the nature which requires mutation; for it is neither simple, nor good. And thus we have spoken concerning continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, and have shown what each of them is, and how some of them are good, but others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship.